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Aryanne Hoofler


As a Christian I have no duty to allow myself to be cheated,but I have the duty to be fighter for truth and justice - Adolf Hitler

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Omnipotence paradox:
>The omnipotence paradox has medieval origins, dating at least to the 12th century. It was addressed by Averroës (1126–1198) and later by Thomas Aquinas. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (before 532) has a predecessor version of the paradox, asking whether it is possible for God to "deny himself".
>The most well-known version of the omnipotence paradox is the so-called paradox of the stone: "Could God create a stone so heavy that even He could not lift it?" This phrasing of the omnipotence paradox is vulnerable to objections based on the physical nature of gravity, such as how the weight of an object depends on what the local gravitational field is. Alternative statements of the paradox that do not involve such difficulties include "If given the axioms of Riemannian geometry, can an omnipotent being create a triangle whose angles do not add up to 180 degrees?" and "Can God create a prison so secure that he cannot escape from it?".
Omnipotence isn't self-contradictory. If "omnipotence" doesn't imply the ability to perform the logically absurd, then the answer to whether or not God can resolve paradoxical questions is simply "No," and He is still omnipotent. If "omnipotence" does imply the ability to perform the logically absurd, then the answer to whether or not God can resolve paradoxical questions is simply "Yes," e.g. He could do something like create a stone so heavy He is unable to lift it, and He could lift it anyway. The contention "But that's logically absurd," is not valid if the ability to perform the logically absurd is implied by "omnipotence." Therefore, omnipotence isn't self-contradictory.
Argument from poor design:
>The argument from poor design, also known as the dysteleological argument, is an argument against the existence of a creator God, based on the reasoning that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would not create organisms with the perceived suboptimal designs that can be seen in nature.
>The argument is structured as a basic modus tollens: if "creation" contains many defects, then design is not a plausible theory for the origin of our existence. It's most commonly used in a weaker way, however: not with the aim of disproving the existence of God, but rather as a reductio ad absurdum of the well-known argument from design, which argues that living things are too well-designed to have originated by chance, so must have been deliberately created by an intelligent God.
Whether there are examples of poor design in nature is highly contested in biology. For example: it's often contested that the human eye is poorly designed because its retina is "inverted" which creates blind spots. It is then countered that the "inverted" retina allows the eye to process the higher amount of oxygen it needs in vertebrates, and that no one has been able to conceive of how it might be modified without significantly decreasing its function, to the point that engineers mimic its design. Appeals to concensus among atheistic biologists are usually then cited, but this is a fallacious appeal to authority, which is a fallacy when used to imply a truth claim.
A design is fallaciously presumed to be poor if it's conceivable there is a better design, rather than only if a better design is conceived. Only when a better design, for God's purpose, has been conceived in its entirety, can it rationally be said one exists.
It is also presupposed that evolution only progresses. While natural selection selects for advantageous mutations, disadvantageous mutations are not necessarily deselected. Therefore, nature alone could account for any perceived poor design in the world.
The problem of evil:
>The logical form of the argument tries to show a logical impossibility in the coexistence of God and evil, while the evidential form tries to show that given the evil in the world, it is improbable that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God.
>logical
Omnibenevolence only implies doing the best and most moral thing, e.g. saving people with free will. It is possible it is logically impossible to do the best and most moral thing and there not be evil. If "omnipotence" implies the ability to perform the logically impossible, it's possible God has created this world with no evil. The contention "But that's logically impossible; there is evil," is invalid if the ability to perform the logically impossible is implied by "omnipotence."
>evidential
Presupposes pain of innocent people is objectively evil, which implies innocent people exist, which implies there was no fall of man upon knowledge of good and evil, and which implies God doesn't decide what evil is, which imply God, and by definition of omnipotence, doesn't exist -- implicit premises that are supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.
>evil can exist objectively without God
1. If God doesn't exist, "evil" is only an idea.
2. Ideas are only subjective.
3. Therefore, if God doesn't exist, "evil" is only subjective.
>and we can know what it is, and it's based on our feelings
If God doesn't exist, the explanation for how our feelings could accurately dictate what is objectively evil is natural evolution, which is self-refuting: If our ability to conceive of truth exists only because it has naturally evolved to be as it is, and nature selects only for traits that help us survive, and knowledge of truth isn't necessary for our survival, then there's no reason any of our conceptions of truth would be correct and we shouldn't believe anything we think or feel, including about morality.
Animals don't believe pain is evil.
Problem of Hell:
>The problem of Hell is an ethical problem in religion in which the existence of Hell for the punishment of souls is regarded as inconsistent with the notion of a just, moral, and omnibenevolent God. It derives from four key propositions: Hell exists; it is for the punishment of people whose lives on Earth are judged to have sinned against God; some people go there; and there is no escape.
Presupposes God doesn't have the right to decide what justice is, which implies God, by definition of omnipotence, doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. God decides what justice is.
Presupposes people who go to hell have any redeeming qualities, which implies God is wrong, which implies God, by definitions of omniscience and omnibenevolence, doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. People who go to hell choose to go there (See: fate of the unlearned); it is the consequence of not doing what we're supposed to do -- its perceived harshness only a testament to the importance of not making that choice. "People" who deny God and go to hell are truly evil, by God's objective definition.
Russell's teapot:
>Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.
False analogy. We observe that we are the only civilzation in the solar system, that teapots don't launch themselves into space, and that there have been no manned missions to Mars -- we observe that it is unlikely such a teapot exists. We make no such observations about the existence of God.
Russel would have no authority to assert there is such a teapot. The bible does have authority. The bible is 66 different narratives, letters, and writings written by 40 different people, five of whom witnessed Jesus after His resurrection, over about 1,500 years that are all theologically synchronous, with minimal, irrelevant "contradictions" that are expected of any such collection of historical documents and only add to its historicity. Its own words also give it authority, which reveal themselves as the word of God to anyone willing to read it as such.
Theological noncognitivism:
>Theological noncognitivism is the argument that religious language – specifically, words such as "God" – are not cognitively meaningful. It is sometimes considered as synonymous with ignosticism.
To assert something isn't cognitively meaningful is to imply cognition of that thing.
This argument can also be applied to anything. It can be said nothing is truly cognitively meaningful, because when enough questions are asked about anything, the answer is invariably "Just because." Thus, all cognition is ultimately contingent on a priori knowledge. If this were to mean there is no such thing as meaningful cognition, it would apply to God no more than it applies to everything. It is axiomatic that the necessity of a priori knowledge does not negate meaningful cognition. Just because it is possible God can't be fully known, doesn't mean knowledge of Him isn't possible.
Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit by Dawkins:
>The Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit is a play on the notion of a "tornado sweeping through a junkyard to assemble a Boeing 747" employed to decry abiogenesis and evolution as vastly unlikely and better explained by the existence of a creator god. According to Dawkins, this logic is self-defeating as the theist must now account for the god's existence and explain whether or how the god was created.
It can't be inferred from the necessity of a creator that there is no creator. Space-time originated with the universe. Therefore, the cause of the universe would be aspacial and atemporal. The aspacial and atemporal doesn't necessitate cause. Therefore, what caused the universe wouldn't necessitate cause. An omnipotent being is capable of being this uncaused first cause.
>In his view, if 'the existence of highly complex life on Earth is the equivalent of the implausible junkyard Boeing 747'(straw man), the existence of a 'highly complex god'(straw man, begging the question) is the "ultimate Boeing 747" that truly does 'require the seemingly impossible to explain its existence'(straw man).
The first straw man misrepresents the existence of highly complex life, in substitution of abiogenesis and evolution, as being decried as equivalent to the implausible junkyard Boeing 747. The former exists; the latter's existence is what's contested.
The second straw man misrepresents belief in God as in "a highly complex god." It begs the question because it assumes God is necessarily highly "complex." It is conceivable that God is a "simple" conception or perception -- an objectively perfect being.
The third straw man misrepresents the existence of something as being "seemingly impossible" only because it's highly "complex." Insufficient cause doesn't imply "seeming" impossibility of the highly "complex."
This isn't even really an 'argument' against God's existence. It's merely a poor attempt to cite inconsistency in a contention against evolution.
Occam's razor:
>Occam's razor (also Ockham's razor; Latin: lex parsimoniae "law of parsimony") is a problem-solving principle attributed to William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347), who was an English Franciscan friar, scholastic philosopher, and theologian. His principle can be interpreted as stating Among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected.
>In science, Occam's razor is used as a heuristic guide in the development of theoretical models, rather than as a rigorous arbiter between candidate models. In the scientific method, Occam's razor is not considered an irrefutable principle of logic or a scientific result; the preference for simplicity in the scientific method is based on the falsifiability criterion. For each accepted explanation of a phenomenon, there may be an extremely large

Evil God Challenge:
>The Evil God Challenge is a thought experiment. The challenge is to explain why an all-good god should be more likely than an all-evil god. Those who advance this challenge assert that, unless there is a satisfactory answer to the challenge, there is no reason to accept God is good or can provide moral guidance.
The argument presupposes evil is based on our fee fees, which implies either God doesn't exist or He doesn't have the right to make evil not based on our fee fees, which implies God, by definition of omnipotence, doesn't exist, which implies there is no reason to accept God is good or can provide moral guidance -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.
Good and evil are whatever God says they are. Good and evil relative to us are only what He wants us to do and not to do. If God had said "I am evil, this is evil and this is good; only do the evil things," it would have been equivalent to saying "I am good, this is good and this is evil; only do the good things." Therefore, an evil god implies a god that wants what he doesn't want, which is self-contradictory. Therefore, the argument is self-refuting.
Even if it were argued that omnipotence implies the ability to perform the logically absurd, it wouldn't imply a god whose existence is logically absurd could exist. Omnipotence therefore existence therefore omnipotence, ad infinitum, is circular reasoning and invalid.
Fate of the unlearned:
>The fate of the unlearned, also known as the destiny of the unevangelized, is an eschatological question about the ultimate destiny of people who have not been exposed to a particular theology or doctrine and thus have no opportunity to embrace it. The question is whether those who never hear of requirements issued through divine revelations will be punished for failure to abide by those requirements.
>It is sometimes addressed in combination with the similar question of the fate of the unbeliever. Differing faith traditions have different responses to the question; in Christianity the fate of the unlearned is related to the question of original sin. As some suggest that rigid readings of religious texts require harsh punishment for those who have never heard of that religion, it is sometimes raised as an argument against the existence of God, and is generally accepted to be an extension or sub-section of the problem of evil.
The argument presupposes God couldn't have so ordered the world that those who never hear the Gospel are only people who would not have believed it and anyone who would have believed it is born at a time and place in history where he does hear it, which implies God, by definition of omnipotence, doesn't exist, which implies God isn't omnibenevolent -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.
We are not condemned based on rejection of the gospel; we are condemned because we are sinners. God's wrath is revealed against everyone who suppresses His truth revealed through creation. God is merciful in that He has provided a way of salvation via Christ for those who will accept Him. But God is also just in that unrepentance will not go unnoticed.
Argument from free will:
>The argument from free will, also called the paradox of free will or theological fatalism, contends that omniscience and free will are incompatible and that any conception of God that incorporates both properties is therefore inherently contradictory. These arguments are deeply concerned with the implications of predestination.
The argument supposes a definition of "free will" that is incompatible with omniscience, which implies such a definition is metaphysically possibly true, which implies God doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.
The argument supposes a definition of "free will" that is incompatible with determinism, which implies materialism, which implies God doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.
A definition of "free will" that is incompatible with omniscience or determinism is not necessarily true, e.g. Christians, whose conceptions of God and free will are allegedly inherently contradictory, don't define free will as the ability to make choices independent of God's knowledge or cause, nor as achievable only by breaking the physical laws of the universe. Free will is only epistemic, i.e. it is contingent only on our knowledge; it is not subject to atheistic definition. Therefore, it is compatible with God's existence.
God of the gaps:
>"God of the gaps" is a term used to describe observations of theological perspectives in which gaps in scientific knowledge are taken to be evidence or proof of God's existence. The term was invented by Christian theologians not to discredit theism but rather to point out the fallacy of relying on teleological arguments for God's existence. Some use the phrase as a criticism of theological positions, to mean that God is used as a spurious explanation for anything not currently explained by science.
God of the gaps is a straw man. Arguments like teleological arguments for God's existence aren't taking 'gaps' in scientific knowledge to be evidence or proof of God's existence; they are inferring to God as the best explanation over materialism. To take a lack of evidence that God is not the cause as evidence that He is the cause would be an argument from ignorance. Ironically, those who cite 'God of the gaps' commit this very fallacy: that if there is no evidence that God is the cause, then He isn't the cause -- assuming a materialistic explanation is by default true, even if undiscovered, until proven otherwise. It is assumed a materialistic explanation is sufficient and thus that there are no other jointly sufficient causes, which is a fallacy of the single cause. This is assumed because of a faulty induction, i.e. materialistic cause is all they've ever seen, and all science is able to study, thus, excluding other reasons, it is all they are willing to accept.
Hitchens's razor:
>Hitchens's razor is an epistemological razor asserting that the burden of proof regarding the truthfulness of a claim lies with the one who makes the claim; if this burden is not met, the claim is unfounded and its opponents need not argue further in order to dismiss it. It is named, echoing Occam's razor, for the journalist and writer Christopher Hitchens, who, in a 2003 Slate article, formulated it thus: "What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence." The dictum also appears in God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, a book by Hitchens published in 2007.
>Hitchens's razor is actually an English translation of the Latin proverb "Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur" ("what is freely asserted is freely dismissed"), which was commonly used in the 19th century.
This is true, however it can fallaciously be taken to mean, as may have been Hitchens' intention, "What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed as false or unlikely without evidence." Those who interpret the statement as such, commit an argument from ignorance -- absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
Incompatible-properties argument, Evil vs. good and omnipotence:
>The problem of evil is the argument that the existence of evil is incompatible with the concept of an omnipotent and perfectly good God.
>A variation does not depend on the existence of evil. A truly omnipotent God could create all possible worlds. A "good" God can create only "good" worlds. A God that created all possible worlds would have no moral qualities whatsoever, and could be replaced by a random generator. The standard response is to argue a distinction between "could create" and "would create." In other words, God "could" create all possible worlds but that is simply not in God's nature. This has been argued by theologians for centuries. However, the result is that a "good" God is incompatible with some possible worlds, thus incapable of creating them without losing the property of being a totally different God. Yet, it is not necessary for God to be "good". He simply is good, but is capable of evil.
If God creating some possible worlds is logically absurd due to His properties, and "omnipotence" doesn't imply the ability to perform the logically absurd, then God could not create those worlds, and yet remain omnipotent and omnibenevolent. If "omnipotence" does imply the ability to perform the logically absurd, then God could create those worlds, and yet remain omnipotent and omnibenevolent (Would He? No, He's omnibenevolent). The contention "But that's logically absurd," is invalid if the ability to perform the logically absurd is implied by "omnipotence." Therefore, His properties remain compatible.
Purpose vs. timelessness:
>One argument based on incompatible properties rests on a definition of God that includes a will, plan or purpose and an existence outside of time. To say that a being possesses a purpose implies an inclination or tendency to steer events toward some state that does not yet exist. This, in turn, implies a privileged direction, which we may call "time". It may be one direction of causality, the direction of increasing entropy, or some other emergent property of a world. These are not identical, but one must exist in order to progress toward a goal.
Presupposes purpose is only a steering of implicitly pre-existent events, which implies God isn't omnipotent, which implies God doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.
>In general, God's time would not be related to our time.
Presupposes God has a time, which implies it's fixed, which implies it can't be changed or that God necessarily has it, which implies God isn't omnipotent... therefore, the argument begs the question.
>Thus God's time must be aligned with our time if human activities are relevant to God's purpose.
Presupposes God can't change his "time" or enter any time He wants at any time, which implies God isn't omnipotent... therefore, the argument begs the question.
>A God existing outside of any sort of time could not create anything because creation substitutes one thing for another, or for nothing.
Presupposes things must be pre-existent; God could not "substitute" outside of time; and true creation isn't possible, which implies God isn't omnipotent... therefore, the argument begs the question.
>Creation requires a creator that existed, by definition, prior to the thing created.
Supposes God can't have existed prior to things created based on unsound premises, and presupposes things have already existed, which implies God didn't create things... therefore, the argument begs the question.
Incompatible-properties argument, Simplicity vs. omniscience:
>Another pair is divine simplicity and omniscience. An omniscient God must necessarily encompass all information in the universe. Information is not "ineffable" and cannot be reduced to something simpler.
Divine simplicity only means God is without parts -- that He is His attributes. If the information God "encompasses" is an attribute of His, its "complexity" is irrelevant. If the information God "encompasses" is not an attribute of His, its "complexity" is irrelevant. Neither contradict the definition of divine simplicity.
Argument from inconsistent revelations:
>The argument from inconsistent revelations, also known as the avoiding the wrong hell problem, is an argument against the existence of God. It asserts that it is unlikely that God exists because many theologians and faithful adherents have produced conflicting and mutually exclusive revelations.
This is just as likely if God exists. Many theologians and faithful adherents have produced revelations of a great deceiver, whom produces revelations. Therefore, it is as likely the great deceiver exists as it is unlikely God exists. The likelihood the great deceiver exists is equivalent to the likelihood God exists. Therefore, it is as likely God exists as it is unlikely God exists.
>The argument states that since a person not privy to revelation must either accept it or reject it based solely upon the authority of its proponent, and there is no way for a mere mortal to resolve these conflicting claims by investigation, it is prudent to reserve one's judgment.
Modal scope fallacy and false dichotomy. Not "privy" doesn't imply necessarily not privy, and those aren't the only options. The only way for a "mere mortal" to be privy to revelation is by investigation. Therefore, it is prudent to investigate, not to reserve one's judgment.
>It is also argued that it is difficult to accept the existence of any one God without personal revelation. Most arguments for the existence of God are not specific to any one religion and could be applied to many religions with near equal validity. When faced with these competing claims in the absence of a personal revelation, it is argued that it is difficult to decide amongst them, to the extent that acceptance of any one religion requires a rejection of the others. Further, were a personal revelation to be granted to a nonbeliever, the same problem of confusion would develop in each new person the believer shares the revelation with.
Deciding among them is irrelevant upon personal revelation.
Argument from nonbelief, J. L. Schellenberg:
>1. If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.
>2. If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
>3. Reasonable nonbelief occurs.
Presupposes reasonable nonbelief in God is possible, which implies God, by premise 2, doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. If God exists, it is possible reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
>4. No perfectly loving God exists (from 2 and 3).
>5. Hence, there is no God (from 1 and 4).
Version for students:
>1. If no perfectly loving God exists, then God does not exist.
>2. If a perfectly loving God exists, then there is a God who is always open to personal relationship with each human person.
>3. If there is a God who is always open to personal relationship with each human person, then no human person is ever non-resistantly unaware that God exists.
>4. If a perfectly loving God exists, then no human person is ever non-resistantly unaware that God exists (from 2 and 3).
Presupposes temporary states of non-resistant unawareness imply God is not perfectly loving, which implies God, by premise 1, doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. Only persistent states of non-resistant unawareness are relevant. Since this argument is a later presentation of the former argument, it also equivocates temporary states of non-resistant unawareness with aware nonbelief, presumably in order to manipulate the students at whom it's aimed.
>5. Some human persons are non-resistantly unaware that God exists.
>6. No perfectly loving God exists (from 4 and 5).
>7. God does not exist (from 1 and 6).
Argument from nonbelief, Theodore Drange:
>1. If God exists, God:
>1a. wants all humans to believe God exists before they die;
>1b. can bring about a situation in which all humans believe God exists before they die;
>1c. does not want anything that would conflict with and be at least as important as its desire for all humans to believe God exists before they die; and
>1d. always acts in accordance with what it most wants.
>2. If God exists, all humans would believe so before they die (from 1).
>3. But not all humans believe God exists before they die.
>4. Therefore, God does not exist (from 2 and 3).
It is possible it isn't logically possible God could create a world in which as many people that have believed in Him in the actual world freely choose to believe in Him, and in which not as many people choose not to, and that therefore, creation of the actual world is implied by omnibenevolence. If "omnipotence" implies the ability to perform the logically impossible, it's possible God has brought about a situation in which all humans believe God exists before they die. The contention "But that's logically impossible; not all humans believe God exists before they die," is invalid if the ability to perform the logically impossible is implied by "omnipotence."

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