As a word of warning, this installment of Paper Tigers will be very extensive. To begin with, the combat experiences of the M4 Sherman cover both the European and the Pacific theater, and all of the campaigns within. These combat experiences reveal different attributes and faults that would be missed if only one area was the focus. Further than this, the Sherman served with just about every allied country, and 'their mileage may vary,' which is also important to consider, and I will try to incorporate other countries experience with the Sherman as best as I am able. Then there are the myriad of changes and upgrades applied to the tank both in a ad hoc and official capacity which changes its combat capabilities as the war goes on. In all, the Sherman is a far more complex tank to cover than the one front one theater T-34/76 or 85, which remained little changed over their lifetime. Indeed, if a good summary of the Sherman is what you want, I recommend Steven Zaloga's "Armored Thunderbolt" for a beginner, and then Hunnicutt's "Sherman: a History of the American Medium Tank" if you are a real diehard. With that out of the way, strap yourself in for the long haul, and hear about the M4 Sherman, starting with 75mm cannon.

The basic origin of the Sherman would have to be the M2A1 or the M1 combat car, which are both the same vehicle. These little .50 caliber armed tanks were basically the starting point for American tank development in general. These light tanks began production in 1935, but requirements were drawn up for an enlarged tank based on the m2 light. The design process for this was lackadaisical, and the M2 medium was introduced in 1939. Unbeknownst to the army, this tank was already on the cusp of being rendered totally obsolete by the T-34. Indeed, tank development wasn't a priority for the U.S Military (the navy was receiving top billing at this time with its new impressively modern battleships) until the fall of France in 1940. This lit a fire under the asses of the army, and immediately new facilities were made to build tanks for a war that looked evermore likely. in July design work began on an interim tank based on the M2, being the M3 medium. It soon became apparent that the M3 was not a ideal solution, so in February of 1941 design work started on the medium tank T6. By December the design was done, and starting in February of 1942 the medium tank M4 began production. Within 2 years of the army requesting a modern medium tank from a country that had paid tank development such little attention before the ordinance department had developed what can be argued to be the best tank in the world at the time. With the background out of the way, we will begin our analysis.

Armor.
The basic armor scheme of the M4 would remain the same for the entirety of the war, with minor alterations throughout, and also the up armoring effect of various field modifications. The frontal armor was most altered between variants. The cast hull M4A1 had 51 mm of armor, sloped at between 48 and 70 degrees as the hull shape changed, with the general armor thickness of 90 mm.

The M4 hull was flat plate with the 51 mm of armor at 56 degrees, giving about 91mm of armor thickness from the front. However, the steeper slope made the driver and assistant drivers’ hatches bulge out from the front of the tank, and these presented easily identifiable frontal weak spots. As a result these usually had 25mm armor plate welded to the front at an angle, giving a spaced armor effect that nullified this frontal weakness.

Finally, the M4A2 and M4A3 shared a 63.5 mm plate angled at 47 degrees, giving basically the same 90 mm of frontal armor while eliminating the driver and assistant driver weaknesses.

The cast turret had 75 mm of armor at the front, but its sloping made it effectively 100 mm thickness unless there was a square shot on the mantlet. This was remedied by an improved mantlet that added 15 extra mm of armor and a gun shield that was added at the same time as a new telescopic gunsight, which added an additional 50mm of armor to the turret front and made the total mantlet 140 mm thick. after having experiences of rounds going through the turret front at the side of the mantlet and killing the commander additional armor was welded onto this area, and eventually became a integral part of the casting and increased the turret frontal armor on the gunners and commanders side to 90mm.
The sides and rear were 38mm, with no sloping. Extra armor was applied on dry ammo storage Sherman's around the ammunition, increasing armor here to 63mm. this was removed when wet stowage was introduced. Turret sides and rear were 51 mm.

In 1942 this armor was only slightly less effective than that of the T-34, and its turret was far tougher, with the T-34/76's turret thickness of 45mm absolutely overmatched. in fact this armor performed better than expected even against foes like the Tiger. A German report in Hilary Doyle's book "Tiger I Heavy Tank 1942-1945" estimated that a Sherman angled at a 30 degree angle was immune to fire from the Tiger at any range, and that a Panther would have to move to within 100 yards to get an effective penetration.
As the war drew on though, the guns facing the Sherman increased in potency, and the influence of the Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust weighted heavily on tankers. To combat this, sandbags were piled onto these tanks. A test conducted late in the war determined that the addition of these sandbags would not stop penetration from the sides, but actually were somewhat effective from the front.

In the Pacific theater the armor of the Sherman was just as effective against Japanese weapons as the armor of the panther was against American ones. The best Japanese antitank weapon that was actually used in combat, the 47mm type one cannon, was only capable of penetrating the Sherman's sides. The more likely threat to the Sherman was magnetic mines, so several Sherman's were adapted with wood frames over the armor to defeat these mines. In some cases, they also had nails welded onto the tanks to discourage Japanese infantry from trying to board.

However, armor protection should also consider the effect of the round upon penetration. Early war Sherman's with ammunition in side sponsons and large ready racks were very prone to burning. a report by the US army stated that 65 percent of the dry ammo storage Sherman's burned upon being hit. The British also conducted their own reports, concluding that the Sherman would burn 80% of the time following 2 penetrations. however they also looked at the burn rates of German tanks, determining that 80 percent of Pz IVs would burn after 1.5 hits (with a sample size of 5, so this may be inaccurate), 60 percent of Panthers would burn after 3 hits (from a sample size of 22) and 80 percent of Tigers would burn after 3 hits (from a size of 5.) the introduction of wet stowage with the M4A3 dropped the burn rates down to 10-15 percent.
And while burn rates matter, how the tank burns is also important. A Russian account by Dmitriy Loza (hero of the Soviet Union who drove in Sherman's) recalls that when T-34's were lit on fire, their ammunition would explode the tank, sending shrapnel everywhere and killing the crew if they were too near. He also described an incident where his tank was hit and he was forced to hide under the tank with his crew to hid from German fire. The tank then caught on fire and he was certain he was going to be killed, but the ammunition never exploded catastrophically.

Finally, the soft steel armor of the Sherman was very resistant to spalling. The same Dimitry Loza also recalled that in his T-34 rounds that hit but failed to penetrate caused spalling in on case, injuring his crew. This never happened to him in the Sherman.
In all, the Sherman’s armor was better than most people give it credit for, but in 1944 and 45 was no longer sufficient.

Armament.
The 75mm Sherman used the M3 75mm cannon. Its greatest attribute was the variety of ammunition that was available to it. The main round was the M48 high explosive, with a series of different fuses and propellant charges available to it for different tasks. because of its lower muzzle velocity it could have thinner walls and more explosive than the American 76mm high explosive round, so many tankers preferred to have 75mm guns on hand for this application, and some even turned down the opportunity to have the 76mm cannon due to this. The 75mm gun also had 2 smoke rounds, the M88 base emitting smoke round and the M89 white phosphorous round.
The M89 was in a pinch a useful antitank weapon against heavily armored panthers from the front. The round would blind the enemy momentarily and allow the shermans to get to cover or flanking positions, but the white phosphorous would also be sucked into the tank by its ventilating fan. Inexperienced crews would often believe their tank was on fire and bail out, so Sherman's would fire machineguns into the smoke a few seconds after firing to kill the crew. While not a fool proof tactic at all, it did give Sherman's a better chance against heavily armored tanks than other countries that lacked this option.

The gun also had the T30 canister shell, which was vital in the French bocage and also in the pacific theater. The 76mm Sherman's did not have a similar round to this, nor did they ever have a white phosphorous round (sorry 'Fury', but you couldn't do that).
Finally the gun had a pair of armored piercing rounds. First was the solid shot M72, which was not aerodynamic and bleed speed and penetration capabilities quickly. The more successful of the two was the M61, an APCBC round with a explosive filler. This round was capable of penetrating 90mm of flat armor at point blank, dropping below 80mm of flat armor penetration at 500 meters. While this round was basically incapable of defeating the Panther or Tiger from the front, it was capable of defeating the much more numerous Pz IVs and Stug IIIs from around 500 yards in ideal conditions, while they would have issues dealing with an angled Sherman. indeed, the Germans estimated that a Sherman angled at 30 degrees would be immune to fire from a Pz IV H at 100 meters, while a Pz IV H's hull could be penetrated by the Sherman's gun at that range and angle (to say nothing of the turret, which at 50mm thick on the Panzer IV could be penetrated by the Sherman at basically any range. This round was not particularly successful at taking out enemy armor, but as short range and with flank shots it was more than capable. Also, the substitute standard M72 round had better penetration at close range, and with this it was possible to penetrate even the Tiger from the front under the most ideal conditions.

If the Shermans AP rounds were ineffective against late war German tanks, they were useless against the Japanese, but for the opposite reason. The most advanced Japanese tank that saw service, the type 97 Chi-ha Kai, had 25mm of armor at the front. The 75mm Shermans AP round would go straight through the tank without detonating, doing minimal damage. It quickly became doctrine to shoot Japanese tanks with HE rounds, which would at a minimum destroy all the rivets on the tanks armor and injure the crew, or essentially disintegrate the tank.

Finally, the Sherman had one of the best secondary weapons of the war, the M2 Browning .50 cal. originally designed as an antitank machine gun, the M2 was fully capable against soft targets and also against many infantry emplacements. It was also a good light AA weapon, and gave Shermans some ability to counter airpower in the rare occasion that it was encountered. And it’s tracer round allowed the commander to identify targets with ease. In all, the Shermans firepower is also better than usually stated, but on the antitank side of things clearly lacking by 1944-45.

Mobility.
The universal feature of the 75mm Shermans as far as mobility is concerned is that the flotation was lacking. The 75mm Shermans never got the HVSS suspension of the late 76mm E8 Shermans, and because of this the track width was 16.5 inches. Combined with the length of track in contact with the ground, the pressure per square inch for the early Sherman's was 13.7 PSI, and as armor steadily increased this did as well, eventually getting to 15 psi or so on 76mm gun tanks. Comparatively, the T-34 and even the heavy German Panther had better ground pressures. The T-34/76 had a fantastic 9.1PSI and the Panther had 12.5 PSI. Even the impractical king tiger had only barely inferior ground pressure to the M4A3 75mm, at 14.65 PSI compared to 14.3. What this meant was that in muddy or boggy terrain the M4 was inadequate. To combat this shortcoming, after proving its usefulness on the M4A3E2 assault tank, duckbill additions were placed at the outer end of the tracks of Sherman's. This increased the width of the tracks by slightly under 3.6 inches and reduced the ground pressure to 11.77 psi for the heaviest of the 75mm Sherman's, the M4A3 75mm (W). While helpful, this was not widespread until the end of 1944.

What is not universal amongst the Sherman's is the engine and its performance. In fact, the Sherman's had 4 main engines to be discussed. The wright-continental R975 radials, the Chrysler A57 multibank, the GM 6046 twin diesel, and the Ford GAA.
The R975 was the main powertrain of the M4A1 and M4 series of tanks. It was adapted from a radial airplane engine, and as such consisted of 9 cylinders positioned radially around a central crankshaft. Producing 400 HP at its peak with the C1 variant, this gave the M4A1 and M4 good power to weight ratios of 13.1 HP per ton. The C4 variant improved to 460 HP. the engine was also common so parts and mechanics who were familiar with it were plentiful. However, the engines radial design was unfamiliar with most tankers who were used to conventional engines. Also, it had an issue with constantly overreving, which dug into its service life.

The Chrysler A57, however, was not as successful. Made for the M4A4, the engine consisted of 5 6 cylinder inline engines arranged radially. The US army rejected it in favor of the M4A1, M4 and M4A3. The US Marines rejected it for the M4A2 with the diesel, as did the Russians who stated that the engine was a gas guzzler and too expensive (although they may have preferred the M4A2 because it used diesel like the T-34's). Only the British accepted it, and it seemed that they actually quite liked it, comparing it favorably in terms of reliability to the powerplants of the Churchill and Cromwell tanks. Also, it produced a lot of power, with 470 HP, but due to the tank being lengthened in order to accommodate the engine this gain in power to weight was slight at only 13.5 Hp/ton.

The M4A2 used by the Marines and the Russians used a diesel U engine, which was basically 2 separate inline 6 engines that both output to one driveshaft. This engine provided 410 horsepower at peak, but due to increases in weight caused by the engine had the lowest HP per ton at 13. While I do not currently know the Marines stance on the tank, the Russians one is mixed. On the one hand, the account of the tanker states that the engine had the ability to cut power to either of the units, which was useful if either of them had been damaged and allowed the Sherman to limp home. On the other hand the Russians had issues with the engines fuel injectors. They ran too hot, and would melt or wear away at the pistons and cause premature failures. The Russians also had issue with the clutch that regulated the two engines RPMs and turned the drive shaft, it had issues keeping the engines at the same rpm, and wore out quickly because of it. In all they figured that the worst flaws would be remedied if there was adequate cooling, and at this point I do not know if this was enacted.

But the best engine for the Sherman was the Ford GAA of the M4A3. This engine was a V8. It was familiar to anyone who had ever serviced a V8, just a bit bigger.it was lightweight because it had its origins in an aircraft engine. It was very reliable. And it had the best horsepower, at 500 HP it had the best horsepower to ton of 14.36. In all, this made the final M4 with 75mm a very mobile tank.
Indeed, the Sherman's good horsepower to ton figures allowed it to scale the mountains in Italy with relative ease, when the Germans believed that they couldn't be. The Sherman's speed varied with the variant, but it was always on the slower end of the spectrum, ranging from 22 mph to 30.
Reliability.
If the Sherman was the best tank of World War II for any one thing, it would be mechanical reliability. Despite all of the varied engines, the Sherman maintained exceptional reliability in all tasks. As I have said before, if you want a clearer and unbiased view of a tank, give it to a friend. In this case, the friend will be the British.
They used 2 M4A2’s, 3 M4A4’s, 3 Cromwell III’s, 2 Cromwell I’s, and a few Centaurs for shits and giggles. They drove them in a race of sorts, when one tank of each type reached 3000 miles, the trial would be stopped for that tank and they would draw conclusions. And here they are!
The Sherman dominated. The Sherman friggen dominated. More Shermans got closer to the 3000 mile mark than Cromwells. The Shermans required half the Man-Hours of maintenance of the Cromwells. They had nearly half the total number of defects of the Cromwells. And over the course of 3000 miles none of the Shermans required a Powerplant or transmission change. And as a final twist of the knife, the M4A2’s usually arrived before the faster Cromwells, pointing to the Shermans excellent strategic mobility.

In comparison to the late war German tanks, the Cromwells, the T-34’s, and the Panzer IV’s the Sherman easily comes out on top with few complaints about its mechanical reliability. But what happened when something went wrong?
Reparability.
While the Shermans reliability may have been fantastic, it may even be eclipsed by its ease of repair. The tank was designed with easy field repairs in mind. For example the whole transmission could be unbolted from the front, craned away by a standard 2 ½ ton truck, and have a new one installed in relatively short order. The VVSS suspension (Vertical Volute Spring Suspension) was simply bolted onto the side of the tank, if it had issues it was simply unbolted and a new one added. This also made the suspension readily upgradable, which it was from a light duty to a heavy duty with stiffer springs and a redesigned return roller. If work needed to be done on the engine it could just be detached from the drive shaft and craned out for the work.

If the tank wasn’t burned out the armor was easy to patch because of its low spalling soft steel.
And finally, because this tank was mass produced and parts were not handmade or hand fitted, any replacement parts for any failed components would just drop in because they were exactly the same as the original. the time honored engineering traditions of having good GD and T analysis allowed the Sherman to be so simply fixed. The design as far as modularity goes was practically unparalleled.

But all of this amounts to nothing if there are not spare parts to go around. But there were. The best example that I can give of this comes from our Russian source Dmitriy Loza.
He speaks of a time when during a 100 mile march on a hot day the rubber started peeling off of the tanks return rollers, and eventually they had to stop. He reports this to his commanding officer who thinks its some kind of bad joke. He believed that they would be halted for a while, based off of his T-34 experience. But quickly (he doesn’t specify how long) enough return rollers were brought to service every tank in his corps, and within three days they were back in combat. That gives an impression of how many spare parts there were with the Sherman’s, even in a country that did not use it as their mainstay. Dmitriy also talks about how the tanks rubber tracks caused them to slide on ice, but mentions that the American technical advisor attached to them reported this to Detroit, and the very next shipment included special links of track to prevent this. Dmitriy concluded that “every deficiency he observed and reported was quickly and effectively corrected.”

The Sherman was probably the easiest tank of the war to repair.
Ergonomics.
As far as crew comfort and ease of fightability goes, the Sherman was overall pretty good. By the end of the war, one could argue it was the best in this terms, but for the initial 1942 model this would have been a harder argument. Like on the T-34 we will go through each seat, how it changed from the first M4A1’s to the final M4A3’s, and discuss all the pros and cons associated. First, the bow gunner’s seat.
There isn’t too much to it. He sits on a seat that can either be in a high position for riding with the hatches open or a low position for buttoned up fighting. He has a periscope in the hatch that can elevate and swivel, and another further from the gunner that is locked in place. He has a .30 caliber browning with a ton of tracers, which he needs because he has no sights. He just directs the tracers to the ballpark area of where they ought to be, and that’s about that. He also has a sizable hatch in the bottom of the hull to escape out of in times of desperation, and there are stories of marine Shermans medevac’ing wounded soldiers through this hatch. Because the bow gunner has such little to do, I’ll talk about the changes in the hatch and front hull here. The early Shermans had smaller hatches because of the thinner but more sloped frontal armor plate. On their introduction these hatches were just hatches. In early 1943 springs were issued that were attached to the hatch that greatly eased their opening. When the Shermans changed to the less sloped but thicker frontal plate, they got more room for the hatch and these were the large hatch Shermans. The spring was lost, but the hatches became half the thickness so they were still easy to open. To the driver.
The driver has the same seat, and he has the same periscopes. What is different is that he has to drive, and he doesn’t hate himself. The Sherman can be driven if you can drive a manual. It only requires one clutch, which doesn’t require the force of Stalins will to engage. The gears throw without the usage of a hammer. It steers with a traditional tiller arrangement. And it comes with the standard gauges, fuel, RPM, even a speedometer. It is perfectly adequate. To the loader then.

The loader has his own seat, which is nice. He has a turret basket, so he isn’t always shuffling around. He has a nice little door in the turret to chuck spent shell casings out of. The gun has a absolutely opulent recoil guard. And the ammunition in the side sponsons is easily reached on the early models. He even has a rotatable periscope to assist in observation. It seems that the only thing that he doesn’t have is a hatch to escape out of. And he won’t get it until October of 1943. Until that point he is third in line for the commander’s hatch if the tank is on fire, which on the early Shermans is very much still an issue. If the Sherman had a design flaw as far as ergonomics go, this is the big one. However starting October 1943 this is remedied, and hatches are sent over to all theaters with instructions on how to cut the turret roof and install it. With the transition to wet stowage the ammunition is now located under hatches in the turret basket, but is still easy to get to. With that, the gunner.
The gunner initially has only a periscopic sight, with 1.4 magnification. This sight was kind of a piece of shit. It went out of alignment easily, and its low magnification didn’t do it any favors. However, in February of 1943 the new gun shield and telescopic gunsight that the British requested arrived. As stated before, it increased the mantlet armor and added a addional 50mm gunshield, and the telescopic sight was a 3x power. This add on coupled with the retention of the periscopic sight allowed the gunner to have a wide view optic to get the gun pointed in the general area before switching to the limited field of view telescope. This gave him quicker ability to find and aim at a target than every other nation’s main medium tank with the exception of the Cromwell with its similar arrangement and the T-34/85.
The Gunner also had the single axis stabilizer, which was actually very effective if he was trained it its use. This gyroscopic device was mounted under the gun, and was to be engaged once the traditional ratcheting elevation system was disengaged, to allow the gun to maintain its elevation during travel. Finally, he had a azimuth table which allowed the Sherman to perform the role of indirect artillery fire when necessary.

The commander doesn’t have too much to contend with. He has a seat behind the gunner as always, he has a SCR 508, 528, or 538, which receives 20 different radio wavelengths and transmits on 10. Our soviet friend stated that they had very good quality and were capable of broadcasting on high frequency (close) and low frequency (for distance). Interestingly, he has a turret travers override that he can use to bring the turret to bear on targets he has identified, making the gunners job of acquiring targets that much easier. His cupola is initially kind of crappy, it is a split hatch design that opens in two pieces, and one of those has a single swiveling periscope. His visibility is pretty poor, but the hatch design does allow him to command the tank unbuttoned better than the T-34. At the start of 1944 this changes to a new cupola, with six vision ports and a single piece hatch with a rotating periscope. This cupola is much improved.
In all, the ergonomics of the Sherman are passable for 1942, but by 1944 this is one of the most comfortable and easy to command and fight from tanks in the world, and I can’t think of one that is more convenient.
Production. About 33,000 75mm Shermans were produced in the war.

Conclusions: As far as the 75mm Sherman goes, I think that it is usually very underestimated by popular history. In general, they seem to focus squarely on the gun being too small, the armor being too thin, and at least they made a ton because they got knocked out so often. And yes, against the Panther and the Tiger and the King Tiger the gun was lacking. But the M4 wasn't only fighting tanks, and when it was fighting armor it wasn't only fighting those tanks. Most of the time the 75mm gun was perfectly capable, and in fact a bit more capable than the 76mm in terms of ammunition choices and high explosive power. And while the armor was no longer great in 1944-1945, it was still better than these people say, and the Shermans good ergonomic design allowed its crew to get out. Belton Coopers book "Death Traps" gives people the exact impression, that they were death traps. but the Sherman had one of the highest crew survival rates per tank knocked out of the war. By no means was it perfect, but when all things are considered, it did fantastic in most respects, and not bad in others. In a game of averages, It comes out on top.

Soon I will add the 76mm gun Shermans, then give my final thoughts, and at the end of all of this, my sources.

The continuation of the Sherman's story, with the advent of the 76mm Shermans.

One would not believe it, but immediately after the introduction of the Sherman the Army Ordinance board started working on both upgrading the current Shermans and also making the Sherman's replacement. This replacement was the T20 series of tanks, with its variants being test beds for new engines, new transmissions, new suspensions, new turrets, new cannons and similar systems, the list is nearly endless. In many ways, the T20 series was the American tank building industry making a dedicated effort to push the envelope of design and determine what components and design philosophies worked with the American tank fighting experience. While the Ordinance Board was learning many lessons from all of the different designs that were being posited, they were facing resistance from the Army Ground Forces (who were responsible for procurement of tanks). They did not see a urgent need for replacing the Sherman entirely, and wanted Ordinance to simply work on upgrading the current tank. One of the main upgrades proposed was the implementation of a larger gun for fighting enemy tanks with, this being the 76mm cannon. While there was a lot of controversy expressed over even the implementation of this cannon, Ordinance determined that the turret designed for the T23 could be dropped into the Sherman with no modifications (in fact it had been designed for just such a possibility), and this would lead to the creation of the 76mm Shermans.

Armor:
The armor scheme of the Sherman's hull would be unchanged, but the new turret necessitates revisions slight revisions here. The turret front was in essence a 76mm plate with a massive hole cut in for the M62 combination gun mount. This gun mount had a 90mm armored gun shield at the front, backed by a 51mm spall shield behind it, giving it in essence the same 140mm of effective armor on the 75mm Shermans. The turret sides and rear are a uniform 63.5mm thick and as such would stop very little. and that takes care of the turret armor.

However, because I did not mention it in the 75mm Sherman section, I should make reference to the various in field up armoring programs that were implemented in the war. After the invasion of Normandy, and certainly after the battle of the budge tankers and officers alike moved to improve the armor of the Sherman by whatever means they could. Mostly this was the ubiquitous and ineffective sandbag treatment, but several uparmoring programs existed. The 12 Armored Division used concrete poured on the front of the hull, which may or may not have helped.

The Ninth Army came up with a system where tracks were welded to the front hull, then sandbags applied atop that, then a camouflage net added to keep the sandbags secure. this system was actually quite effective against panzerfausts and panzershrecks and had the added bonus of aiding the tanks concealment.

The most interesting program was in Patton's 3rd army. Once told about the dubious value of sandbags, he expressly forbad them, and directed that knocked out Sherman's have their armor scavenged and welded onto existing Shermans. For the M4A3E8's that this happened to, the armor was effectively doubled at the front from 63.5mm to 128. this sloped at 47 degrees gave a effective thickness of 175mm of armor. Along with additional (but variable, it is hard to get precise figures for these) side hull and turret armor these Patton M4A3E8's were finally the well armored tank that the Americans clambered for.

Armament:

The 76mm cannon of the Sherman can be best described as overspecialized. In several ways a good cannon with it's own merits, it also had a series of flaws when compared to the previous 75mm. Perhaps the most pressing of these was the lack of shell choice. Available were the M42A1 HE shell, the M62A1 Armored piercing shell, the M88 base emitting smoke shell, and the M93 HVAP round. Missing from this lineup are the incredibly helpful canister and white phosphorous rounds of the 75mm, which is one of the reasons that the 75mm Sherman continued for the entirety of the war.

Another reason was the anemic performance of the HE round. With 390 grams of explosive as opposed to 680, the power of the 76mm round compared to the 75mm was lacking due to the stronger shell required to withstand the higher velocities it was fired at. However, there were some advantages to be had from this weaker explosive filling. The tank destroyer corps had already discovered that the blast effects of this round, while not as damaging to structures or emplacements as the 75mm, had a similar killing radius against infantry to the 105mm howitzers, and as such M10's were routinely pressed into a makeshift artillery role. In situations where roads and similar infrastructure were to be damaged as little as possible while still having the killing effect the 76mm cannon and its HE was the prime contender.

The M62 armored piercing round was able to penetrate 109 mm of armor at 1000 meters in the most ideal of circumstances, a solid increase from the m61, and theoretically giving it the ability to readily defeat the Tiger. but on a battlefield that was not ideal, the cannon was only situationally capable of defeating the big cats, and in a lot of these situations (panther side on, for example) the 75mm Sherman was also readily capable of doing the job. The main advantage, and where the 76mm cannon made it's presence best known, was in finally giving the Sherman the power needed to reliably defeat the Panzer IV's and Stug III's that made up the preponderance of the German armored forces at virtually any range.

But the Sherman had a silver bullet, and that was the M93 HVAP round. with over 100 millimeters of flat armor penetration at 2500m, it looks promising on paper. in reality though, it had a hard time penetrating the things that the M62 couldn't either, so its effectiveness was limited. but a better penetrating round is a better penetrating round, and tankers clambered for them. Sadly, the tungsten that was usually used in this round was needed for machining tools, and usually each tank would only get one a month.

In all the cannon was a mild improvement in the armor defeating category, but at the loss of a lot of operational flexibility. If the gun had the same variety of ammunition that the 75mm gun had it would have probably been a flat out improvement in all areas but high explosive effect, and even there it wasn't all bad. But without the canister and white phosphorus rounds and with somewhat worse HE, the fact that the cannon isn't able to beat the Panther frontally is more noticeable and a bit less forgivable. Is it still a good gun? At the end of the day yes, but it needed to be better, one way or another.

Mobility:
The only real change of the mobility from the 75mm Sherman's was that the flotation cross-country was worse, being around 15psi. However, the M4A3E8 had the widened tracks, and this made the flotation quite good. At 11 PSI it had better cross country performance than the Panthers and Tigers, which were well known for their off road capabilities.

Reliability: It's the same as the 75mm variants, so it's basically the best.
Reparability: It's the same as the 75mm variants, so it's basically the best.
Ergonomics. Well, the turret is different, but the layout is basically the same, and while the gun is a bit larger so is the turret. Really, it's the same, which by the time it was introduced in 1944 means it was the best.

Conclusions:
The 76mm Sherman is at a glance quite analogous to the T-34-85. It's a improvement of a preexisting tank that sacrifices flexibility for ability to defeat armor, and like the T-34-85 it isn't really even a end-all answer to defeating armor. But unlike the T-34-85, it really isn't that far improved over the M4 75mm. The reliability and reparability and ergonomics are all exactly the same. The armor is essentially the same, and any armor improvements could just as easily be made to the 75mm's as well. Even the new HVSS suspension that the E8 enjoyed could have been applied to the 75mm tanks if the Army thought that was a priority. In this case the only thing that really differentiates the two is the 76mm cannon, and it gives up a lot for better penetration. If it had more ammunition types, then I could see this being a straight improvement, but it didn't. Keep in mind that I'm not saying that the tank is bad at all, it just doesn't seem appreciably better.

But in the case of the 76mm Sherman, that isn't really a issue. At the end of the war there was roughly a 50-50 split between the 75 and 76mm Shermans, and this to me seems like the golden ratio. The 76mm and its better anti-armor capacity was necessary, but so was the 75mm Sherman's HE pitching power and round choice. At the end of the day, the 76mm Sherman is a supplement more than a improvement.

You know, for all the technical talk of tanks these days, people seem to forget actual battlefield victory relies more on tactics.

6110641
yes... to a point.

obviously having good tactics and strategery is going to be the main factor in winning a engagement or battle or war, and superior equipment used stupidly will not do as well as mediocre equipment used well (and the French and to a extent the soviets would learn this the hard way), but equipment is what allows you strategy.

in the case of the Sherman, its fantastic reliability and reparability made it able to do two things better than any other tank in the war. Shermans could exploit maneuver warfare to its fullest because they could be depended upon to drive hundreds of miles, and Shermans could react to enemy breakthroughs thousands of miles away with a greater rapidity than any other tank because they could just drive and wouldn't need to be loaded up on trains or trucks to react. Without the Sherman, Patton may not have reached his legendary status. Just like without the early Panzers Rommel and Guderian wouldn't have been able to enact blitzkrieg because their tanks simply wouldn't have had the mechanical staying power to last in the field as a coherent force.

while tactics in the short term and strategy in the long term are the deciding factors of victory, equipment is usually the deciding factor of tactics and strategy. which is why I (and many others) like discussing it.

Very nice can't wait to read the next.

6110511
Please put this on a story format so I can read it later? I NEEDED something like this and would like to have this "on demand" easily so I can "prep". Same goes for any future Paper Tiger "articles" please.

6110511
Nice read. Was very enjoyable.
Anything on 105 shermans? Were those just for anti-infantry and anti-pillboxes?

6110693
ty

6110873
I don't think I can? or at least don't know how. I mean, you can bookmark the page, or just check the forum every once in a while. because it ain't leaving.

6110997
the 105's? may be able to whip something up on those. but it's low on my list.
the short version is that they are a somewhat improved version of the 75mm's, but with a lot of drawbacks that keep them from being a out and out improvement.

Be forewarned, there are fewer pictures than I would like, because the British suck at taking good pictures that are not of 'tank A drives across field B' Anyway, to the article.

The Sherman Ic and Vc Firefly

In general, and as previously discussed, popular culture has not looked back too kindly on the Sherman tank. It’s a tommy cooker, they call it the Ronson because it lights up the first time every time, It’s gun is incapable, and it has no armor. And while almost all of this isn’t true or is at least exaggerated, that’s how the Sherman's are viewed… except for one. And that one would be the Sherman Firefly. And that one somewhat escapes the pop culture view, because it could fight Tigers and Panthers. In fact, It shows up in pop culture somewhat frequently. Way the hell back in 2005 I got Call of Duty 3 for Xbox 360, and my favorite level of the game was the one where you were a Polish tanker, driving a Firefly and blasting Tigers and Panthers to bits. Also, it inexplicably showed up in that shitty tank anime show with the Americans team, and it didn’t make any sense but it was there. What I’m trying to say is that people rate the Firefly decently well because of its anti-tank capability’s. And from this, the important questions. Is this tank an overrated paper tiger, and is this tank the best of the WWII Sherman variants?

To begin with, a little bit of history on the Firefly. The British army had a fairly traumatic experience in their fighting Rommel in the desert, and that fighting had basically proven the inadequacy of British tanks of the time. While they may have had good tank mounted antitank weapons in 1940, the 2 pounder was showing its age, and the better 6 pounder was already being rendered obsolete by the introduction of the Tiger 1. Luckily for the British, their ordinance department had already come up with a antitank gun that would easily destroy the Tiger, that being the 17 pounder. The one issue was mounting it in tanks and self-propelled guns. This would be covered in the next generation of British tank design. Having been basically shown up by the Americans and their Sherman, despite the Americans absolute lack of experience in tank design, the British were motivated to regain their stature on this front. As such, the next cruiser tanks would be the Cromwell and Challenger. The Cromwell would have the powerful Vickers 75mm High Velocity gun, which would shoot the same powerful HE round of the Sherman but would have better AP penetration than the American 76, basically providing the best of both worlds. And for anything that the HV couldn’t handle, the Challengers and their 17 pounders would.

But then that all fell apart. The Vickers 75mm HV wouldn’t work with the Cromwell’s relatively small turret ring, and the Challenger was proving to be a massive failure. The 17 pounder cannon needed an incredibly large turret to accommodate it with the required gun depression, and this necessitated a lengthened chassis, and to keep in its weight that required thinner armor than wanted. The result was a huge and unarmored target, and no one was keen on wanting to use it.

                The answer then was modifying the gun to fit into the Sherman. After all the Sherman had a large turret ring and would technically be able to carry the gun. But not as it was, it needed modifications to fit, but if it could, the tank could handle the weight and the recoil. But because the other plans that were made to create a suitable anti-tank weapon had failed, and because by this time the invasion of Europe was impending, the need for the Sherman to be able to carry the 17 pounder was enough to necessitate them making such modifications.

And so they were made, the single recoil spring at the bottom of the gun was replaced with a pair located on the sides, the breech block was rotated to face the loader and ease his loading process. The gun tube was widened near the base so that the gun would be balanced at the gunshield as opposed to being front heavy. Finally, the radio was moved from its space to a special armored basket welded to the back of the turret. And with these extensive modifications to the gun, the tank was ready. So how was it?

Armor:

Well, the armor was the same as it was on the Sherman’s because it was a Sherman. Either it had the heavily sloped regular M4 hull with the hatch budge weak points, or it was a composite hull Sherman, named so because of the cast front hull welded onto the standard rear hull. Honestly, the armor scheme in it of itself was the same as on a regular old Sherman.

What was different was a matter of survivability. See, the British Sherman’s did not get the wet stowage racks that the American M4A3’s and reworked M4’s and M4A1’s had. They had the same burn rate the whole war. And that burn rate was 80% after 2 penetrations. And that is the difference, and it’s huge. Basically, I’m saying that there is a reason that it had the nickname “Tommy-Cooker”, and there’s a reason that it was called Ronson (which is British) instead of Zippo. While the Americans mostly solved the fire problem, the British didn’t. The only thing to help alleviate this on the Firefly was the low in the hull storage of ammo as opposed to the use of the side sponsons, but the wet racks would be sorely missed.

The only other thing to mention is the fact that the British much preferred steel track to the rubber ones that the Americans did. And it seems that they liked having spares, lots of spares.

Lots and lots of spares.

God knows if they helped.

Armament:

The whole point of the Firefly is the gun. And the whole point of the gun is to knock out enemy tanks. So is it good at that?

Of course it is. Why wouldn’t it be?

Its penetration potential is almost exactly on par with the Panthers gun, with its armored piercing ballistic capped shell able to penetrate 150mm of flat armor at a kilometer and 100mm at 3 (though if it could hit at 3 km is another matter. And remember that the Panther had an end all be all antitank gun. There were precisely 4 targets that the Firefly could not penetrate with this round; the front plate of the Panther (although as we have seen if it shoots it enough it may shatter, and penning the turret was no issue), the front of the King Tiger, the front of the Jagdtiger, and the front plate of the Jagdpanther.  Everything else was fair game. And for these targets the Firefly had something revolutionary, an Armored Piercing Discarding Sabot round.

Very briefly, let’s discuss what the hell the purpose of an APDS round is. Penetration is closely tied to the kinetic energy of the penetrator, and kinetic energy is determined by the formula ½mv², with m being mass and v being velocity. So the way to increase kinetic energy is either A) increasing the mass of the penetrator, or B) increasing the velocity. The important thing about this is that kinetic energy increases exponentially with increase in velocity, so the easiest way to increase penetration is making a round faster as opposed to bigger. So, to get a round faster the APDS does the following. It puts a sub caliber round into a very lightweight housing that separates after leaving the barrel, allowing the low mass penetrator to get the maximum velocity of the cannon and therefore have the best penetration possible. The British were the first to create this, and the 17 pounder was the first tank gun to use this round. And its penetration was incredible, capable of penetrating 233 mm of flat armor at 1 kilometer, and easily capable of defeating the Panthers front plate.

Between these two rounds, the Firefly mounted the most powerful antitank rounds in the western allies’ arsenal, and was on paper capable of defeating nearly anything.

firefly's roofless cousin shooting. its as close as I could get to the real deal.

But you friggen know that there is a catch. And there is. The 17 pounder had a bit of a dispersion problem.

As always, ask a friend if you want a more accurate and less biased (or just a differently biased) opinion, and in this case the friend is America. Post war a Firefly (well, a M4A3 that was given the Firefly’s turret, but close enough) was trialed against a M4A3E8 and a M26, and the gunnery results were interesting.

At 500 yards, you could expect to put all rounds in a 15x15 inch box. At 1000, a 30 x 30 inch box, as one would expect. At 1500 yards though, you could still put all your rounds into that same 30 x 30 inch box, there just isn’t a change in dispersion. But when you get to 2000, it abruptly doubles. The army was a bit baffled by this, but at the same time didn’t really care, because the 17 pounder had about 50% more dispersion than the 76mm and 90mm. now is this a problem?

A little? But not too much. The round can flat out penetrate most tanks anywhere, and the only tank that had a zone of immunity that required accurate shooting at weak-points was the Panther, which needed hits to the turret to be penetrated. And seeing as how the Panther’s turret is 72 inches wide and 30 inches tall, a good gunner would almost be able to guarantee a hit (and most likely a pen) at 1500 yards. And that’s pretty damn good.

No, where the accuracy problem really comes into play is with the APDS. Simply put, the round was too new, and there were issues with it. A APDS round can be extremely accurate, and with its ultra-high velocity can make it easy to lead far off targets, but there is also more going on with it than just setting off an explosion in a confined space and imparting spin on what comes out of the end. The jacket has to come off, otherwise it is basically the least ballistically efficient round in existence. And no one knew how to do this yet with the 17 pounders APDS because it was the second round of its type in existence. So the petals of the sabot jacket wouldn’t detach at the same time, and because of that the penetrator would experience drag only on one portion of it, and go flying off into oblivion as a result. When the US army tested it, it only put 8 rounds out of 10 on a 6’ by 6’ft board at 500 yards. So it could theoretically hit a panther at this range, but at 1000 yards, they didn’t hit once, and they just gave up.

But it’s worse than that. The jacket was made of duralumin, and it would drag onto the rifling of the barrel and be deposited. After 28 rounds fired in the American trials, this fouling ruined the guns accuracy for the next 40 shots. So in the field a British TC would have to ask himself if it was worth the risk to the gun and worth the risk of missing to fire an APDS round. It was great on paper, but I am positive that 95 percent of the time a TC would choose the regular old APBC.

But there is another round for the firefly, and it is pretty important.  And no one seems to know the whole story, not even Hunnicut. It had 3 rounds, only 2 of which I have any information on. First is the High explosive 1.T, which had a bursting charge of 580 grams. The British didn’t really like this shell, thinking it was too weak. And yes, it was 100 grams less than the Sherman’s 75mm round, so this complaint was valid, and based on this the British wanted 1 firefly for every 3 75mm Sherman’s. The second was a reduced charge shell with 490 grams of explosive, and I don’t know what the hell the point of this was. But finally there is the mysterious shell, the one that I don’t know a damn thing about, the one that made the British say “we can up the ratio of Firefly’s to Sherman’s to 1 to 1 now.” The Reduced Charge High Explosive 1.T High Capacity Super, or RCHETHCS for short. Here’s what I know. It had less propellant, so it didn’t go as fast (1800 ft. /sec as opposed to 2950 ft. /sec), so it didn’t need as strong a case, so it could have more explosive filling. And it’s already only 100 grams behind the Sherman’s charge. So did it get there? Did it have a good HE round? F*** If I know.

So there we go, the 17 pounder is a very good anti-tank gun, and may have been a good HE slinger too, every bit the competitor to the Panthers fantastic cannon.

Mobility:

The mobility is basically the same as the other Sherman’s. It has a ground pressure of 13.6 Psi for the Vc, or 14.23 for the shorter and lower track length Ic, which ain’t great m8, and it’s fairly slow at 40kph on road. Depending on the type it has a HP to ton of 11.8 gross (for the Vc with the Chrysler A57 multibank) or 13.28 gross for the Ic, due to its more powerful Wright-Continental R975 C4. And that’s about it, except for the grousers. I can’t give any numbers, because there isn’t much info about them apart from the fact that they existed, but the lowered the ground pressure. And there’s that. It isn’t super good, but it isn’t bad either.

Reliability:

It’s the same as the other Sherman’s, because it’s a Sherman. Thank god this section was quick.

Reparability: you know the drill, it’s a Sherman. Of course it’s good.

Ergonomics:

Alright, back to the meat and potatoes. How were them ergonomics?

First, the assistant driver. He doesn’t have to worry about anything, because he isn’t a crew member on this tank. He has been replaced with ammunition. Ok then

The driver is the same as on any other Sherman. Easy peasy. But now it gets different.

The loader. A lot has been made about the loaders position, and basically all of if bad, but is it really much worse than the 75mm Sherman’s?

Pretty much.

Where to begin? First, the obvious. The breech and associated guards are bigger, restricting space. Sure, only a few inches bigger, but ergonomics is a game of inches. Then there is the round itself. Its bigger and harder to handle in the available space. Now, the army did say during testing that the issue is not moving the round or its weight, they thought that it was quite reasonable. No, the issue is its bulk. With a 75mm round, it’s nice and short, and a loader could feed the tip of the round into the breech from the bottom and tip it up and in. with the 17 pounder, there just isn’t enough room. The round has to come all the way up and level with the breech, then you have to put the base of it against the back turret wall to have room to feed the tip in, and then you can load it. and that extra action both increases the time between firing and also how quickly the loader tires out, giving a Firefly a tested max ROF of 10 rounds per minute compared to the 75mm’s and 76mm’s 20 RPM. In all, it’s kinda crap. And it gets worse, because the tank has only 5 ready rounds available on the turret floor, and after than he must get them from stowage. This is harder to do on a firefly than maybe any other Sherman due to the ammos orientation and positioning. In all, the firefly doesn’t have much endurance for a firefight. There is but one upside.

Because of the cramped position, the British determined that the loader would be unable to make it to the commander’s hatch if the tank was hit, so they made a kit to put in a hatch for the loader. The firefly was the first British Sherman to get a separate loaders hatch. If that isn’t incentive for a loader to want to be in a firefly, despite its ergonomic failings, I don’t know what is.

To the gunner. Good news! He has the telescope and periscope so he can aim quicker. And the telescope has a neat trick, where the lenses could be quickly replaced to change from 3x magnification to 6x. Such a feature did not exist on American tanks, which capped out at 5x for the 76mm gun. So the firefly had arguably the best sights of the lot. Oh, Bad news! He lost the gyrostabilizer, and the elevation controls are in an arm breaking location way the hell below the breech. It’s worse than on the 75mm Sherman, but not terribly much so. In all, it’s workable.

The commander’s positon has the most variation of the bunch. Depending on if he got a vision cupola, or if he had the original rotating split hatch with single periscope, he was either a happy or miserable individual. Apart from that, it’s the same old story. Lots of room, radio behind him (a bit further behind because it’s in the armored box, but still behind) turret override, the convenient and well placed .50 cal mount that the 75mm Sherman’s had. All the features that make a Sherman either marginally acceptable or pretty great to command. It all depends on that cupola.

So, with the crew sorted, were there any quirks to the firefly, or did it just work once you had the crew figured out?

There were quirks.

Number one was flashback. The shell had a lot of propellant, and sometimes not all of it burned off in between the gun firing and the case ejecting. So when that happened, the remaining powder combusted when exposed to oxygen. In the turret. Toasty.

Number two was more serious, and that was the incredible muzzle blast of the cannon when it fired. First of all, the flash was massive. From TC Ken Tout, from the wiki, “The flash is so brilliant that both gunner and commander need to blink at the moment of firing. Otherwise they will be blinded for so long that they will not see the shot hit the target. The muzzle flash spurts out so much flame that, after a shot or two, the hedge or undergrowth in front of the tank is likely to start burning.” In other words, this was not a subtle tank. Further, because of how fast the round went and how much crap that it would kick up the US army determined that if the tank was less than 1000 yards away you would not be able to determine if you hit it until the smoke cleared. Combine your tank being very obvious when firing with having a hard time seeing if you are hitting a target, and you could see the problem.

imagine this, but slightly less pronounced blast but also only 1 or two vision devices to look out of. notice how the firing commander is located several yards away to avoid the main effects of the blast.

In all, the ergonomics are… ok. They aren’t bad, but they are the tanks main failing.

Production: about 2200 conversions. Not bad for something that is the tank equivalent of Ellen Ripley duct taping a flamethrower to her M41A Pulse rifle.

Conclusions:

Well, is this tank overrated? Probably. Is it a paper tiger? No. a paper tiger is a tank that is totally overblown, that isn’t nearly the threat that it’s made out to be. This, this is a decent tank. It can do all the required tasks of a medium tank to decent effect with no real crushing flaws. It just isn’t as good as people make it out to be, and it isn’t as good as people make it out to be because this is not the best Sherman.

As far as the talk of being the best Sherman goes, it is just not as good as a 76mm Sherman in any way. The 76mm has wet ammo storage, a gun that can mostly do what this one does but with twice the rate of fire and no blast issues, and far better ergonomics that allow the crew to get the most out of it. It’s flat better. Now the real question is if the Firefly is better than a M4A3(75)W?

Hold on, hear me out. The M4A3 has a better loaders hatch, a assistant driver, wet stowage for increased survivability, better HE Pitching power from a faster firing gun in a more ergonomic turret, a vision cupola that the firefly may not have, and a better engine. There are a lot of advantages. All the firefly has as a no kidding advantage is its AP power, and that’s giving up a lot for armor penetration. The only reason I wouldn’t side with the M4A3 over the Firefly is because of the unknowns. How close was the High Capacity HE round to the 75mm? Does the firefly have a vision cupola? What hull? If it was a composite hull Firefly with grousers and a vision cupola and the HE is nearly as good then I’d really have to think about it, but otherwise I think the M4A3 is better.

But that’s in comparison to American tanks. Compared to the British Sherman’s, the Firefly is easily superior, and would by far be my pick if I was a British tanker.

In all, the firefly is basically the same as the 76mm Sherman, even if it isn’t quite as good in the role. It’s a tank that’s designed to complement the 75mm workhorses, and do what they can’t. Even though it may not be technically as good as the 76mm’s it fought more and it fought longer, and it carried itself in such a way that it gained the reputation it has. In a way, it’s a case of “don’t meet your heroes”, they never live up to what you expect from them. But usually, there’s a reason they were heroes to begin with.

6179607
Thanks for the upload, I liked it. Heard stories about the muzzle blast problem the 17 pdrs, but didn't realize it was that bad. And yeah, the British really didn't come up with anything chassis wise that was as good as the Sherman until the Centurion. The barrel probably couldn't be any longer to try and get more powder burnt due to balance restrictions, and even then the smoke would be a problem.

During the second world war the United States seemed to be allergic to the idea of heavy tanks, despite a few abortive efforts into heavy tank design. Indeed, they did make the T1 heavy, which in May of 1942 when it was standardized to M6 would have been the most heavily armed and armored tank in the world at the time (for a few months anyway). But all it ever amounted to was 40 tanks with an illustrious career of crushing cars at war bond drives.

They did make 2 T14’s, but that was only because the British begged for it.

At the end of the day the US Army believed that whatever advantages a heavy tank could have were offset by both the mobility and quality of medium tanks and the logistical pain of getting them from Detroit to France. And indeed, they had a bit of evidence saying that this was the right call. After all, France had fallen to a bunch of medium and light tanks that were able to go around the Maginot defense line, and Frances Char B1 did little to prevent that. So, while every other major power (apart from Japan, and don’t come at me with that paper crap) was working on heavy tanks to some capacity, the United States remained totally noncommitted.

But, at the end of 1943, someone must have looked at a map of Europe. And on this map was a defensive fortification called the Siegfried line. the Siegfried line ran from Switzerland to the ocean, so while going around fortifications is always preferable to going through them, the Siegfried line didn’t give anyone that choice. So, with that the US Army decided that it was high time to consider a heavy tank. the only problem was that they had invested nothing into making heavy tanks to this point, so had virtually nothing to go off. So, they went to the Fisher Tank Arsenal of Grand Rapids Michigan, and said “make the Sherman into a heavy tank, you have half a year, tell us when you are done, we trust you enough to not trial it, and if we don’t like it you’ll still be paid in full.”

So, a medium tank that was not designed for the role would have armor slapped onto it in a very short amount of time and be sent into the field before trials were completed and the people making it would make their money regardless of how good it was. If anything ever sounded like a recipe for failure, this is up there. however, what would come out of this would be one of the most respected variants of the Sherman made.

In general the Sherman Firefly is usually known as the best of the Sherman tank series, at least as far as world war two is concerned, because of the seventeen pounder cannon. However in recent years another of the Sherman variants has made something of a comeback and is now vying for the position. This would be the M4A3E2 assault tank, more commonly referred to as the Jumbo.

The reason is simple, while the Firefly may be considered the best because it has the best gun, the Jumbo is similarly being considered because it has the best armor. So the questions remain. Is the Jumbo a good tank, and could the jumbo be considered the best Sherman variant?

Well, let’s pretend that it is May 12 of 1944, and we are ordinance officers receiving the first of the M4A3E2 from the Fisher arsenal. It is up to us to determine if the tank is good enough to be accepted, and privately, up to us to see if it is the best.

Armor:

As far as Sherman’s go this is easily the best armored Sherman of all time. The front and the side hull each received an addional 1 ½” (38mm) of armor atop the original armor. The sides were already 1 ½”, so they went up to 3” total. The front hull was 2 ½” (63mm) so the addition made it an even 100mm. however, because of the 47 degree slope the effective thickness was 147mm. that’s even a bit better than the Panther’s effective thickness. The rear and roof armor were unchanged, but the major modifications were the turret and the differential castings. The differential was heavily thickened, with the armor at the very front raised to 140mm, tapering down to an even hundred. The bulk of the work of improving the Sherman’s armor went to the turret.

The turret casting was immensely thickened, going from 2 ½” all round (63mm) to a shocking 6” (152mm), more than doubling in thickness. The mantlet was even thicker, being 7 inches thick (3.5 of those were the original 75mm turret mantlet, the remainder being a new plate welded to the original) and requiring cuts in the bottom corners to prevent it from fouling the drivers and bow gunners hatches with its immense size.

The effect of this additional armor was complete invulnerability from the front to the ubiquitous Pak 40 75mm, and all of the 75mm guns of the Pz IV’s and Stug’s. The common Pak 36 Flak 88 (so also the Tigers 88mm) was also rendered completely useless against the frontal armor of the tank. however, if there is one thing that the Nazi war machine had mastered, it was building gigantic friggen anti-tank guns designed to defeat all armor in creation. The Pak 42 75mm and the Kwk 42 L/70 cannon was able to defeat the frontal armor of the Jumbo, but even then, at only at a range of around 500 yards and no angling. At between 20 and 30 degrees, even the Panther would be unable to defeat the Jumbo at anything more than point plank range. It would only be the ridiculous cannon of the King Tiger or the Pak 43 that could defeat the Jumbo reliably at combat ranges.

_{A testament to the heavy armor of the jumbo, and a reminder of the fact that it is not invulnerable. this tank was shot at by German 75mm guns (whether they were KwK 40, Pak 40, or Kwk 42 is unknown, no-one was in the tank when it was being shot, for it was evacuated after hitting a mine) and deflected or blocked 7/8 of the shots fired at it with only number 3 penetrating. number 6, however, shows a interesting shot trap that bulged the turret ring and would have put the tank out of action despite failing to penetrate.}

And that is the armor of the Sherman Jumbo sorted. There is only one more thing to keep in mind. A Jumbo did not only have great survivability, it increased the survival chances of the tanks it was platooned with. On point, a Jumbo was likely the tank that would draw fire first and most. It would require quite the knowledgeable German gunner to be able to identify a Jumbo as being separate from a regular Sherman tank at over 100 yards range. So, shots fired in ambush from antitank guns or even enemy tanks against the Jumbo are shots that allow the remainder of tanks in the platoon to be able to reply, and with the Jumbos thick armor, the odds are much increased that no American tanks would be lost in a engagement of this sort. It isn’t even inconceivable for a poorly trained gun crew, upon shooting a tank that his manuals say is readily dispatchable to no effect, to conclude that all American tanks are as stout as the Jumbo is. In all, there is some advantage to having the assault tank of your army be so similar to the standard ones.

Armament:

This section shall be quick. The American 75 mm has been discussed in depth in previous articles, but allow me to cover on a brief note of importance. In my initial 75mm Sherman article I state that the M61 APC could defeat 80mm of armor at 500 yards in ideal circumstances (i.e. without angling) which isn’t wrong but is only correct if the tank in question has rolled homogenous armor. Against face hardened armor the M61 of the 75mm can defeat 80mm of armor at just over 1250 m flat on, and just under 500 meters at any angle. The question then becomes if German tanks transitioned to rolled homogenous armor, because as a rule, they used face hardened armor. For Panzer IV, the answer is that they did in the period between June 13 and August 1 1944, affecting 500 tanks at most. For Stug III, it’s looking like the armor was never transitioned to rolled homogenous plate. However, it is entirely possible that this happened and I just haven’t found the correct research yet. In conclusion, the 75mm was perfectly suitable against most of the armor that it would encounter.

Of course perfectly suitable is rarely perfectly suitable because there is no kill like overkill. Add that into the possibility of running into a homogenously armored Panzer, or the simple fact that while there was a point you could shoot a panzer IV to kill it when angled at 30 degrees it might not be where you shoot or the shot lands (example, if you run into a Panzer IV, angled at 30 degrees and 500 yards away, you can penetrate the side, you can penetrate the turret, but you can't beat the front plate, and that takes up about a just a bit less than a third of the hittable area.) A bigger gun could be useful.

And in January of 45, the army thought so too. The requests for 76mm guns were higher than the amount of tanks coming in, so 250 76mm guns were sent on their own, to be added to tanks in the field. Now, while fitting a 76 into a 75mm turret is possible, it is not easy. However, the Jumbo, which essentially had a 76mm turret and a 76mm gun mantlet was ready made for installing the 76mm.

With the tank able to mount both cannons, it gets the same results as those cannons do. With the 75mm it is near to of its class in engaging soft targets and emplacements, with decent anti tank capability. With the 76mm it gains the ability to defeat most German armor easily, and with HVAP can knock out tiger easily, and panther with some good shooting, but at the cost of HE effect.

Mobility:

The only things to have changed from a M4A3 75mm (W) to the Jumbo as far as mobility is concerned is that the final drives have changed, being lowered in their ratio to provide more pulling force at the cost of speed. So while at low speeds the tank still performs in line with other Sherman’s, it tops out at 22mph. The other change is the addition of the end connectors, bringing the ground pressure to 14.2 PSI compared to the M4A3 75MM (W) 14.3 PSI without. In testing, the Jumbo still outperformed the older M4A1's with the lower HP radial engine. Apart from that. It has Sherman mobility, which is to say average.

Reliability:

Earlier when I said that the tank was not trialed until it was in full production and on its way to fight in Europe I was not lying, but the reason the army felt so comfortable sending the tank over without testing was because they had a pretty good idea of what they were getting into. On December of 1943 they had loaded a M4A3 down with ballast until it weighed the same as the proposed assault tank and proceeded to drive it around for 500 miles with no issue. At which point they determined that whatever tank would be made would be reliable enough for the task assigned, that of a limited engagement assault tank, to be used as required.

In actual testing, it was pretty clear that the front VVSS bogies were under a lot of stress, and at 400 miles they had a bogey failure. While they said that this sort of failure had happened before on other tanks, it was clear that this could be more of a problem for Jumbo than any others.
However, that was basically it. Apart from that, the tank still performed very well in terms of automotives.

Repairability:

When that bogie failed, all that needed to happen to make the tank combat ready again was the removal of 16 bolts, a quick swap, a tightening of 16 bolts, and a track tensioning. The whole thing would take 2 hours tops. Yes, the Jumbo is as easily fixed as any other Sherman, so it is the most easily repairable tank of the war.

Ergonomics:

Take whatever I said about the M4A3 75 (W) and apply it here. Two exceptions though. one, the loaders periscope is not fixed, it is rotatable. Gotta fix that in the main article. Two. Because of the 6 inch thick armor the pistol ports on the turret were removed. This made it more annoying to resupply the tank and eject spent shell casings in combat.

Production:

254 were made, with 250 reaching combat. About 100 were rearmed to 76mm.

Conclusions:

The Sherman Jumbo, despite its slapdash origins, proved to be a incredibly effective vehicle. Able to shrug off all but the most determined frontal attack it granted the Sherman a ability not known since El Alamein, the ability to hold its ground and slug it out with other tanks. It preserved all the hallmarks of the Sherman class, the stellar repairability, ergonomics, and the effective armament. And all it cost was the front bogies possibly breaking at 500 miles, and a loss of 4 mph compared to the M4A3.

If the question is if this is the best Sherman, the answer is an unequivocal yes. If the question is if this is the best tank of the war, I’m hard pressed to think of one that balances everything better. If I was to be in a tank, it would be this one.

Which is why, when I look at the Jumbo, I feel disappointment.

Not in the tank. No, it’s a brilliant tank. But in the army ground forces.

To this day, and maybe until I die, I will never be able to understand why they stopped production at 250. With all the effort that went into making them, new final drives, new turret and differential castings, a new gun mount, I do not know why the tank did not continue in limited production, perhaps on a basis of 1 jumbo for every 4 Sherman’s. Yes, I know that the AGF considered the jumbo the result of the army’s failure to produce a replacement to Sherman. I get it. But it worked. In the field everyone clamored for more Jumbos, as many as they could get. At the end of the war the 12th army group summed up their performance as follows.

“these tanks… were amazingly successful in operation, taking punishment not possible with the standard M4 series tanks. In spite of increased weight no extra suspension troubles occurred and the campaign ended with many of these tanks still in operation.”

Or, put more succinctly by General R G Grow of the 6th Armored Division,

“Get me more M4A3E2’s. Our efforts are canalized . This tank has a chance. We want more of them.”

In January of ‘45 the request for more Jumbos had even reached Eisenhower, asking for as many as possible without disrupting existing tank supplies. They also asked for HVSS. But by then, a Jumbo hadn’t been built for half a year. And if they were just kept in limited production they could have gotten more. And HVSS too. I crunched some numbers, and a HVSS Jumbo would have a ground pressure of 12.78 PSI (better than Tiger, King Tiger, and nearly as good as Panther), and would have had strong enough suspension that suspension failures would have not even been a concern anymore. It would have been even better!

^{The postwar dream jumbo, with HVSS and coaxial flamethrower}

None of that happened. And so, I get to think of what could have been, and confront what is.

But as far as the tank goes, when the worst you can say about it is they didn’t build more, that is a hell of a tank.

7180699
Ayy, Jumbo Sherman! They're freaking amazing, which leads to one wondering why the hell did no one just make more of them instead of Pershings, because it seems quite clear here that every problem the Pershings faced weren't really as bad of a problem with the Jumbo. They're Sherman platforms, so everything that might break down, everyone knew how to fix quickly with their warehouses of spare parts, same size as other Shermans so they didn't really take up more boat space. The only thing the Pershing seemed to have over the Jumbo was the 90mm, which, well, the 76mm probably could do the job well enough anyways.

Maybe someone could try to figure out how to shove a 17lbr into the Jumbo's turret.