Even in 1940, before the Fall of France, the British were aware that automotive technology had increased to the point where new AFV’s could be completely immune to the standard antitank weapon, the 2-pounder cannon. A new gun, the 6-pounder, was already designed and preparing for production, but a new cruiser tank design was needed to mount this new gun.
Then came the Fall of France, and the British were stuck in a situation where they needed to replace the massive amount of material that had been lost in France. This delayed the introduction of the new gun to spring of 1942, and had the effect of postponing the new cruiser to that time as well. However, in March of 1942, the first pilot of the new tank began trials.

And in June of 1944, it went into combat.

How British tanks have been viewed in the years since WWII has always been a mystery to me. While the German tanks and Russian tanks are just about universally praised, and things like Italian, Japanese, and (until recently at any rate) American tanks being condemned just as universally, British tanks have lived in a strange and wonderous in-between. On the one hand, one of the great books concerning British tank developments in the second world war is called ‘the great tank scandal’ and that title almost says it all. But on the other hand, there are at least a few ardent defenders of British tanks from the time. And twice I have been told that the best tank of the second world war was the Cromwell.

So, the Cromwell is what we shall be looking at today. I know that I have promised to look at the Churchills (and that is still coming) but comparatively the Cromwell is far less labyrinth of a tank to sift through. Also, it does make the same sort of statements on British tank design and production that are also made by the Churchill tanks production, so we will also be able to look at that as well. Finally, this is the first of three articles on this subject. This first one will cover the Cromwell’s, the second will cover the Cromwell’s up gunned brother the Challenger, and the last will cover the ultimate of the Cromwell series, the Comet. I greatly look forward to covering that tank, for obvious reasons. But for now, the Cromwell.

Armor.

The Cromwell’s general armor profile was designed at the start of 1942, and as such was intended to beat the weaponry of that year. And yes, compared to such things as the Italian 47mm’s and the shorter German 50mm cannons the armor is effective. However, even compared against the longer 50mm cannon showing up on the Pz III in early ’42 the armor was beginning to look bad, with the standard round able to penetrate the front plate from about a little less than a kilometer if hitting flat on.

But the Cromwell would not see combat in 1942, or even in 1943, so by the time of its introduction the long 50mm cannon on the Pz III is one of the Cromwell’s least concerns. against the 75mm L/43 (the least powerful antitank 75mm) the Cromwell is capable of being penetrated from over a kilometer at any angle at any part of the armor. Against the hull that cannon can penetrate from over 2 kilometers at any angle, and it is only at about 30 degrees against the turret that there is a chance of ricochet at over 1 km. Based on this there isn’t too much reason to go into the armor of the tank much further, but we will cover a few interesting points.

First is the side armor. The Christie suspension was sandwiched between two armored plates, the outer being 25mm and the inner being 10mm around the engine compartment, but being 32mm on the outer and 14mm on the inner around the crew compartment. Some have postulated that this would be an effective counter to the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck. However, the plates are close enough that the penetrator would not disperse before the next plate, so it would not be.

And second is the welded hull variants of the vehicle. There was a run of Cromwell’s that dispensed with the riveted hulls, and because of the weight savings from eliminating the brackets and the rivets these tanks were up armored to 100mm on the front plate and turret front. One hopes that this amount of armor would make the tank competitive, being thicker than the horizontal thickness of the Sherman’s sloped front plate (92mm) and the T-34’s as well (90). It doesn’t, due to the lack of normalization. When a shell hits sloped armor, depending on the shell type and armor treatment it will either penetrate and curve out of the plate (having to penetrate more than the horizontal thickness of the plate) or it will penetrate and curve in (ultimately having to penetrate slightly less than the horizontal thickness. Both rob the round of it energy more than if it hit the plate flush on and was not curved in either direction. Because of this the T-34 and the Sherman are still able to take hits better than the welded hull Cromwell’s, despite the Cromwell’s thicker armor (which, coincidentally, is the same thickness as the Tigers… which leads to the surprising conclusion that both T-34 and Sherman are stouter tanks from the front than a Tiger!)

So, as far as armor plate goes, it is fair to say that the Cromwell is poorly armored for the time and gets a clear mark against it already.

Armament:

The Cromwell was designed originally to carry the 6-pounder cannon, but as the design and development of the tank drew onward it became clear that the 6 pounder was not going to be able to maintain its relevance against enemy tanks. Further, the American tanks and their dual-purpose armament made an impression on the British, and the Cromwell was now required to use a dual-purpose armament of its own. Therefore, while there were 6 pounder Cromwell’s, none ever made it to Europe for use in combat.

The gun the Cromwell was to use was going to be the HV 75mm, which I have mentioned in the Firefly article. This gun was to combine the best of both worlds, shooting the fantastic HE shell of the Sherman’s while also using a purpose built 75mm round for anti-tank duties that would have better penetration than the American 76mm, being a better gun in every way. Unfortunately, at some point in development it was discovered that this gun would be too much for the Cromwell to bear, and there would be issues with making it to begin with, so it was cancelled.

The gun the Cromwell ended up with was the QF 75mm, a 6 pounder that was bored out to accommodate 75mm rounds and fitted with a muzzle brake keep recoil to a level manageable by the 6- pounders recoil system. This gun, despite its great similarities to the Sherman’s gun, has a few quirks to be mentioned as well.

First is the fact that the T30 Canister shell that was used in the bocage and pacific by the Sherman’s was a no go due to the muzzle break. Apart from this, the Cromwell could use any of the Sherman’s shells.

Second is the fact that when issued the M61 shell, the British practice was to pull the round out of the casing, remove the explosive filler and fuse, and replace with a simple plug, turning the round into the M61 shot. There is some controversy as to if this increased or decreased the penetration of the shell, and the answer is not particularly clear. The Shot is fired with the same muzzle velocity as the Sherman’s 75mm, so that aspect of the penetration equation is blessedly the same. However, because the explosive filler is absent the mass of the shell is lower, resulting in less mass and less kinetic energy, and thus less penetration by a whopping 2mm or less at all ranges (so, about 100mm of flat face-hardened armor at 500 yards). There are reports that the void left by the explosive would be filled with either molten metal or concrete, raising the mass and thus the penetration to slightly above the standard pen of the Sherman’s 75mm M61 shell (the one unverified number that I have says 108mm of face hardened armor at 500 yards) but I must go off the drawing and consider it a void.

Now, it seems counter intuitive to remove the explosive and fuse if it will both reduce penetration and post-penetration effects, but the British did have good reasoning. There is much less to go wrong with a solid shot than with a shell. Fuses were not the most reliable items back in the day, and it was very possible that the shell could go off before the target had been penetrated due to an over sensitive fuse, resulting in a target surviving a hit that could be fatal otherwise. It was just as possible that a fuse could be non-sensitive, and simply not go off after penetration, reducing the round to the efficiency of shot anyway. There was also a historical reason. The 2-pounder was initially introduced with shell, which had poor armor performance and was far outdone by the shot introduced later. This colored British thoughts on the matter well into the future, and thus they were the only tank building nation to stick predominantly to shot.

The HE shell was the exact same as the one used on the Sherman… unless of course it wasn’t. There are two rounds that by their naming convention are undoubtedly British. The first is the 75mm HE Mk I, the second is the 75mm WP Mk II. These shells differ from their American counterparts (the M48 and the M89) in a few interesting ways.

For the HE Shell, it loses the variable M48A2 fuse that the American shells have, which allow the individual shell to be set to either an impact detonation or a .15 second delay. Instead the Mk I shell has either the M46 impact fuse, or the M47 delay fuse, which limits the versatility of the shell. Also, the shell does not have a ballistic windshield, reducing its range. Finally, it does not even have the muzzle velocity of the M48 shell with supercharge (1980 ft per second compared to 1812 ft per second). So what the hell is the point of this round, you ask? The point of this round is 750 grams of explosive, compared to the standard rounds 670. With that, all the errors of this shell are forgiven.

The WP round is the same as the MK I, except that it carries WP.

In conclusion, the 75mm gun of the Cromwell is analogous to the 75mm of the Sherman, as we all knew before this section. However, the possibility that the AP and HE shells were marginally better than the American counterparts is at least interesting. But in all, nothing too world shattering.

So, let’s talk about something a bit more world shattering. Let’s talk about the Cromwell’s other gun.

This isn't actually a Cromwell, but a Centaur, which will be discussed later. One of the only 90 that saw service, this was with the Royal Marines, firing off of the decks of landing ships as makeshift artillery. They then came ashore and fought for the opening of the Normandy Campaign.

The other gun that the Cromwell was equipped with, used in the Cromwell VI, was the QF 95mm tank howitzer. This gun is a prime example of one of the great British WWII traditions, that tradition being looking around the workshop in panic and slapping things hastily together out of bits that you have laying around. Joining a long and mostly successful lineage including the Sherman Firefly, the Churchill NA75, the 77mm cannon, and the sten gun (again, mostly successful), the 95mm howitzer used the breech mechanism of the 25-pounder artillery piece, the cut down barrel of the 3.7-inch AA cannon, and the recoil mechanism of the 6-pounder. When the engineers realized this Frankenstein was terminally back heavy, they simply added a massive counterweight to the front. This gun was intended to bring something new to the British tank arsenal, that being a dedicated large caliber HE cannon that could be used as an assault gun. The primary task was to be destroying heavy enemy positions with large (relatively) caliber HE rounds, with secondary missions of providing smoke screens for infantry, and artillery support at the company level (or Squadron level, if you are British). These tanks were usually provided for 2 per squadron, to be committed as the headquarters unit saw fit.

Usually, this was in the role of a large caliber direct fire assault gun. In this way, the howitzer Cromwell was unique. Russia and Germany would use casemate self-propelled guns such as the SU-122, SU-152, or perhaps the STUH 42 or Sturmpanzer. The American equivalent, the 105mm Sherman, was used as an artillery piece first and foremost, with only a manual traverse on the turret. The howitzer Cromwell’s kept their power traverse, and apart from having a hefty HE punch performed just like a regular tank. The HE shells weighed 25 pounds excluding the casing, but evidence points to it having a larger explosive capacity than the 25 pounders 900 grams. A comparison of the velocity of fragments between the 95mm HE and 25 Pounder has the 25 pounder fragments going 2200 ft/second, while the 95mm fragments go a full 1000 ft/second faster, and can penetrate a half inch of soft steel. Adding to this a HEAT shell with 110 mm of penetration and this cannon seems to powerful… until I run into a very concerning report.

This gun has a bit of a dispersion problem.

OK, Ok, the 17-pounder had a bit of a dispersion problem as well, but it wasn’t all that bad. I mean, it could put all its rounds in a 60”x60” box at 2000 yards, right? So how bad is the dispersion of the howitzer?

Well, at 500 yards, it has a 90% chance of putting its rounds in a vertical zone 2.2 ft tall.

OK, so that’s not great, but I mean, that’s not terrible, right?

And a 90% chance of putting its rounds in a horizontal plane 30.5 yards wide.

Holy shit.

Remember the last time that I said holy shit? I do. It was when the Panther was statistically more likely to break down than to run out of gas on road. This is that level of bad. Who cares if it has a great HE shell when there is a decent chance that you can literally miss the building that you are shooting it at from a paltry 500 yards. And at artillery ranges, like 5000 yards? It’ll land somewhere within one football field of where you aim it. And just for good measure, it can’t elevate enough to shoot that far and the HEAT round has never been confirmed to be issued. So, it’s a good thing that these were only issued at a rate of 2 per squadron.

This really makes me appreciate the 75mm more. But considering that it is 1944, that 75mm is looking old. And it should, it’s a gun from 1942. But that said, it still works in a lot of cases. It’s getting threadbare, and wearing thin, but it’s in pretty good shape for the shape that its in.

Mobility.
So far in the paper stats we have had one clear failure in the realm of armor and a passable score in terms of armament (if it’s a 75mm, the 95mm is a total friggen failure). Not a particularly auspicious start, but now we get to the strong suit of the Cromwell, being the mobility. The question here is if the mobility will prove to be a letdown.

No, no it won’t.

The Cromwell has precisely two faults in the context of maneuverability, the first being that the tracks are a bit thin (14 inches wide), and ground pressure is a bit on the high side at 14.78 PSI. this is resolved somewhat on the Cromwell MK VII with the heavier armor, now having 15.5” wide tracks, and a PSI of 13.76. The other fault is a glacial reverse speed. The number that I have seen (that seems right) is 2.26 miles per hour in reverse for early gear ratios, and 1.9 mph for the later ones. I have a book (Cromwell Vs Jagdpanzer IV by David Higgins) that states that this speed is 12 Km/h (or 7 MPH), but this is the reverse speed of the Centurion. No, the best source that I have is a vehicle specification sheet that lists the final drive ratios and gearbox ratios, plus the engine RPMs. All that I need to calculate the speed is the radius of the drive wheel, and then I can calculate it.

Good thing the Cromwell’s mobility faults are now totally taken care of. So, what’s good about the Cromwell’s mobility?
Simply put, the Cromwell is very fast, very maneuverable, and better off road than one would expect. This is because of two wonderful creations married together to produce a thing of automotive beauty.

One is the Rolls Royce Meteor engine, a variant of the famous Merlin that powered the Spitfire, Mustang, Lancaster, and a multitude of other aircraft. The Meteor had been modified for use in tanks, most noticeably by removing the supercharger. This engine initially produced 500 HP, but with modifications to the cooling system and airflow to the engine this was boosted to 600 HP by the time the Cromwell exited trials. However, with more adjustments to the oil system and magneto, the meteor produced a ridiculous 650 HP. Combined with a weight of 27.5 tons, this gave the Cromwell an impressive 23.6 horsepower per ton. For those keeping score at home, that’s the same as the Gross HP to ton of a Hellcat with the better engine. Damn.
What this translated to was speed. The Cromwell originally could do upwards of 40 MPH, or 64 KM per hour, making it the second fastest armored vehicle of the war behind the Hellcat. However, at this speed there was concern that the suspension could prove troublesome, and so it was reduced to 32 MPH (51 Km/H) by adjusting the gear ratios later in production. This gave it the added advantage of having extra grunt at all gears, allowing better acceleration and ability to power through mud. Keep in mind this is still on the fast end of the spectrum, only being beaten by T-34-85 and early Panthers that did not have de-rated engines. Still, you may be thinking that this would only amount to above average mobility, as opposed to the purported top tier mobility that I am positing. Which leads us to the second half of the mobility marriage, the Merrit-Brown Z5 Triple Differential gearbox.

We have briefly touched on gearboxes and steering systems before, when talking about the tiger. As a refresher, most tanks in the interwar and early war period used what is called clutch steering. Clutch steering is simple. When you have the gas on both tracks get power. When you pull a tiller to steer the tank, at first the clutch to that track disengages, the track loses power, and the tank starts to turn as rolling resistance slows the track down. Pull the tiller further, and you activate a brake on that side to stop the track and turn the tank more rapidly. This is simple, but has a few problems. First is that neutral steering is impossible, second is that all the power to one side of the vehicle is wasted when turning, and third is that the brakes must absorb a lot of heat. This is what the T-34 and panzers III and IV used.

The first fix is to add a differential. This is basically the same as above, but now before the brakes are activated the power is split though a differential, and one track now goes at half the speed of the other. No matter what gear you are in, you get one turning radius, unless you go full on and apply the brake to one side. Neutral steering is still impossible, but now you are not wasting power when turning. This is what the Sherman and the Hellcat used.

If you want to get crazy, you can add another differential for a double differential system. Now we are getting to the point where things start getting witchcrafty, with a differential for each track, a separate braking system, and a steering shaft that runs at a constant speed that feeds into the differentials and gives us the steering effect we want. Practically, this means that we can neutral steer, no power is wasted when turning, and you can adjust the turning radius by changing gear. This is what the Tigers used (Panther used something similar, that unsurprisingly sucked a bit more).

Now let’s add another differential to this, onto the steering shaft so that we can control at what speed it rotates. This in turn lets the driver continuously adjust the ratios the tracks are turning at, and allows smooth turns of any radius at any gear. This is the holy grail of tank steering, and this is the Merrit Brown triple differential. All the power that the engine makes goes to the tracks, it is unconstrained by what gear it is in to make turns, it can neutral steer. it can basically do anything that the driver asks of it. And because all the power goes into the tracks, it can handle mud and offroad conditions well, just by virtue of the fact that none of the power is wasted. T-34’s in mud may have good flotation, but if they do not keep up their speed they can be stopped when attempting to turn by the incredible rolling resistance when they disengage the clutch. Cromwell doesn’t have that problem.

And because of this, the Cromwell is fighting the Hellcat for the prize of being the most mobile tank of the war.

Reliability.
As we move away from paper stats and into these last 4 fields, the Cromwell’s British origins make themselves well known, because now we will inadvertently dig into the Cromwell’s long, and painful, and laborious development. And we will need to start that with the reliability of the tank. To change things up, let’s start with the conclusions.

The Cromwell that came ashore on D-Day plus 1 and fought all the way until it took part in a victory parade in Berlin was a reliable tank. It was Sherman levels of reliable, capable of going hundreds of miles in a single day with nary a complaint, only some concerns about the rubber peeling off the roadwheels during its longest road march, the charge from France to Belgium following the Normandy breakout. It didn’t require any major component changes for 3000 miles, again, a feat only rivaled by Sherman. This was one of the most reliable tanks of the war, reliable to the point where generals wrote letters to the manufacturer praising the tanks reliability, stating quite unequivocally that no other tank could have done what the Cromwell did. The best anecdotal evidence that I can find of this was a letter from Major General Verney, following the charge from France to Belgium following the Normandy breakout. It states that for 3 weeks the Cromwell’s of the reconnaissance regiments operated without maintenance, moving and fighting continuously from dawn to night, and lost only 4-5 tanks per regiment of 54 to mechanical breakdown. Compared to Tigers operating without maintenance for a shorter time (2 weeks) and a shorter distance (220miles compared to about 250 miles), where all of them broke down, and you can see that the Cromwell was a steadfastly reliable tank. Only the fact that I cannot find the report of the Cromwell’s last 3000-mile trial keeps me from potentially announcing that this is the most reliable tank of the war. Again, though, it is in the top tier with the Sherman and the T-34-85.

But it wasn’t always.

Working our way backwards from 1944 to 1943, we run into a topic that has already been covered when discussing the Sherman’s reliability, that being exercise Dracula. Exercise Dracula was a 3000-mile trial, conducted with 5 Cromwell’s, 3 Centaurs, 3 M4A4’s, and 3 M4A2’s. the Centaur is arguably the most important vehicle in the trial, because this trial was designed to kill it off. At this point the Cromwell was not for sure the next generation of cruiser tank, and there was some discussion on if it would be preferable if the Cromwell chassis should use the older Liberty engines from the crusaders. This engine was nearly half as powerful as the Meteor, and the Tank Corps were well motivated to prove that the aging liberty engine was far past its prime and no longer acceptable for tank combat. The intent was for the Cromwell and Sherman’s to be proven reliable to the same degree, and for the Centaur to be given a coup de grace. This did not happen.

While the one of the 5 Cromwell’s was able to have one example complete 3000 miles, it required roughly double the maintenance of the Sherman’s, and had roughly double the issues. Not particularly auspicious.

As far as named issues that would present themselves during this trial, there were a few that stood out to the board. the track pins were weak and limited the life of the entire track assembly, but a fortunate logistics screw up meant that the extra track pins were actually for Valentine tanks, and because the Valentine is an underrated little tank they actually worked better than the ones the Cromwell came with. The suspension was taxed near the breaking point, the brakes inadequate for steering or stopping (and the parking brake would disengage when the tank cooled down and the metal contracted), and the engine was giving issues too. Among the 5 Cromwell’s, there were failures of the starter, dynamo clutch, but most importantly oil leaks on 3 of the 5 that were so bad they needed immediate repairs. The issue was with the radiators, being placed in a position described as “fundamentally wrong” and susceptible to oil leaks and overheating the engine, taking the tank out of action immediately. The final strike against it was the hydraulic mechanism of steering that was being used on the tank at the time. While it did allow the tank to take fullest advantage of the mobility provided by the gearbox and steering system, it also required constant attention to keep calibrated, and was oversensitive to driver input. This combined with the braking shortcomings lead to one of the vehicles flipping over during the trial, but thankfully no one was hurt.

Out of these the ones that I can confirm were fixed were the suspension, the tracks, and the issues with the engine leaking. This essentially leaves the hydraulic steering as the final issue, and while I cannot confirm that it was fixed from a report, anecdotally everyone’s recollection of the Cromwell is that it was a dream to drive. It is not that it couldn’t break and was hard to control. So… maybe fixed?

Before this though, there were the trials of the Cromwell in America in spring of 1943, and these trials include much the same disappointment.

Repairability:

While the reliability of the Cromwell may have been world class, the reparability was much more middle of the road. Outwardly, you would expect this to be very, very similar to the T-34-85 in terms of reparability. After all, most of the features are the same. You have the same Christy suspension, the same powerpack with both the engine and the transmission mounted at the rear. However, the main issue with Cromwell that is surprisingly not included with the T-34-85 is the accessibility to these components.

With T-34-85, there is a port to access the transmission with, and failing that, several bolts to undo the entire rear armored plate, as well as the top covering, allowing fantastic access to the engine and transmission for repairs and maintenance. for Cromwell, all access to components must be through the top, and the layout of hatches changed repeatedly depending on the hull type (improving each time to be sure). However, these hatches were only for basic interactions like changing spark plugs, filling up oil, replacing air filters, ect. To pull the engine or any other major component out required pulling off the entire hull roof behind the turret, a pain that is reminiscent of major repairs for the panthers transmission. Granted, it is not quite as bad because the components just lift out and you don’t have to remove any other equipment, but it does raise the spectre of that terrible repair.

A issue that was disappointingly similar to the T-34 was the Christie suspension. If this suspension needed to be worked on, here is what had to happen. First, remove the track. Second, remove all the road wheels. Third, unbolt the outer armor plate. Now you can access the suspension. This is impossible to do in the field, and tanks that needed work had to be returned to a workshop, so it’s a darn good thing that the suspension was made into a reliable component.

The final gripe comes down to the hydraulic mechanism for steering. While it might have been made reliable, to my knowledge it never was made easier to work on and would require regular and extensive maintenance when compared to simpler mechanical mechanisms.

In all, the Cromwell sits between the high ends of easy repairability (Sherman’s and hellcats) but above German vehicles such as the Tiger and Panther. It rates, as far as I am concerned, at about the same level as the yet to be covered Pz III and Pz IV, a little bit below the T-34-85. It is not outright bad, but it is not very good at all.

Ergonomics:

Starting with the bow gunner, you get the distinct feeling that the Cromwell is not going to set the tanking world on fire regarding its ergonomic performance. However, it also isn’t too terrible. While tight, it is workable. The bow gunner like on later Sherman’s and T-34’s, has only one job and does not double up as a radio man. The tool he is given is the Czech based BESA machine gun in 7.92mm, and this is a good gun for the purposes of being a tank mounted machine gun. the gun is positioned in front of the gunner’s face, so he does not have to bend over to aim it like on T-34 and does not have to spray from the hip like on Sherman. Similarly to the Panther the Hull gunner gets a telescopic sight for the besa. unlike the panther, he also gets a periscope to the left of the gun, and unlike even the King Tiger, it is adjustable in elevation and traverse. This means that the bow gunner can do both aimed fire and hosing an area by looking through the periscope and adjusting tracers. This is probably the most effective bow gunners’ seat of the war.

How the bow gunner pays for this is in the hatch. This hatch is not located above him in the hull roof, but hinges on the hull side, and when open makes takes away a part of the hull roof with it. This hatch is not very big and is difficult to squeeze into and out of and is a constant source of complaint in reports and recollections. However, the one advantage of this hatch is that no matter how the turret is oriented it is possible to get out though it, so it meets the minimum requirement. For the bow gunner though, this hatch balances out the good gun position.

The driver has similar working quarters. Yes, he is constrained in terms of room, but he is well equipped with speedometers, rev counters, pressure gauges, and all the other necessities in convenient locations. As mentioned before the tank is easily driven, with gas, clutch, and brake pedals on the floor, steering tillers to his left and right, and the gearbox between his legs. He has two periscopes to look out of, as well as an armored plug directly in front of him that can be opened for more visibility. The position only has two flaws, the first being with this plug. If it was open, and if your tank wasn’t the lead tank, this was just the easiest way for dust and dirt to fly directly into your face. The trials report asked for a glass screen, or a mesh, or something like the Sherman’s rain hood that allowed the driver to have the hatch open while raining, but as best as I could tell, there was no luck.

The second also has to deal with the hatch. It’s worse than the hull gunners. It is located directly above the driver which is nice, but it is easily, and I mean easily, blocked by the turret. If the turret is not facing directly forward, at lease one of the two hatch flaps is blocked from opening, and the area left to escape through is hard to get out. You can’t go through the hull to use the hull gunners escape hatch because of a bulkhead in earlier models, and just the crap in the way like the hydraulic fluid reservoir and gauges on the later ones. The turret is also out of the question, being blocked off by ammunition storage. And finally, there was no escape hatch in the floor. This looks like a death trap, and that’s because it is. There are multiple angles that the turret can be rotated where both hatches are blocked, and when this happens… I think the driver just dies. This hatch did get a field modification to make the two hatch doors triangular, which allowed the one furthest from the turret to give the driver more room if he was unable to open them both. Eventually on the F-Type hull the driver got the mixed blessing of the hull gunners hatch, but at least could escape.

In the turret, the gunner is a cramped individual to be sure, but aside from that is happy. The controls are well laid out, and he can adjust elevation and traverse simultaneously. He has access to a telescopic sight, adjustable in power from 3-6 and range adjustable as well, with markings for range estimation and lead. He also has a periscope for identifying targets from behind cover and for better field of view. Apart from the tight quarters, there is not much to complain about.

Less happy is the commander. While he does some things going for him like an easily accessed radio immediately behind him, he also does not have a ton of room to contend with, and more disappointingly has a mediocre hatch. This, the ‘vision cupola’ is a rotating cupola with a split hatch design, with one periscope to look out of. The horrid situational awareness that this provides mandates that he command unbuttoned. The All-round vision cupola introduced on the F-Type Cromwell fixes this issue, but we will discuss this cupola later.

Also given a mixed bag is the loader. On the one hand, there are some positives. While cramped, he does have the most room to work with. Also, he cannot complain about the amount of ammunition that he has access to. Under the gun are 12 rounds, 6 closer to him, and 6 on the gunners side. Surrounding the turret basket are rounds in armored bins, with 19 in close proximity to the loader, and a further 14 at the front of the turret. After this the remaining rounds must be replenished from the gunners side, but the amount of ammo readily available is pretty substantial, and regardless of the turrets orientation there is always going to be available rounds. He also has a hatch to escape out of, a traversable periscope to help with observation, and a smoke grenade launcher that can be used for screening.

However, on the other hand, he has to help load the Coax, with is confusingly mounted on the gunners side of the turret, so loading was a 2 man job, with the loader passing the ammunition over the 75mm gun because the gun feeds from the right and is mounted on the left. This is a nonsensical arrangement and I have never been able to find a good reason for it to not be mounted on the loaders side. Also, he must contend with a seat that is described by the Exercise Dracula report as ‘most uncomfortable.’

In all, for most of the tank I would say that it gets a average or slightly above average score. Yes, the overriding theme is that the tank is cramped, which is not good, but all of the controls that the crews have to work with are well laid out and easy to use (except for loading the besa). In fact, if the commander had a better cupola, and the driver did not have a hatch that was trying to kill him, this tank would get a good ergonomic score from me. Not the best, but good. And seeing as how these issues were resolved on the Cromwell VII’s with the F- type hull, there were some Cromwell’s that get a good score from me. But for the most part, they get a average rating.

Production:

I have dreaded writing this section, because while this is usually a easy section to write (oh, this many tanks were built, that’s a lot!) in the case of the Cromwell it will not be, because I now have to explain just why this tank that began construction in 1942 was only fielded in 1944. So, lets start at the beginning.

Before Cromwell, there was Cavalier, a tank that was externally and internally very similar looking, with the main difference being in the engine and transmission. The engine used was the Liberty engine designed in America at the end of World War I for aircraft use. Being near 25 years old, it was growing more and more underpowered by the day, and was not as reliable as more modern engines. However, at the time there wasn’t a better option for a cruiser tank. At this point, there were British tanks operating with bus engines. The transmission came from crusader, a twin transmission system that essentially has a separate transmission for each track, with steering being done by changing the gears on the left or the right side. This was mechanically wasteful, complex, and on the crusader was not the most reliable. And so it seemed that cavalier was doomed to mediocrity.
However, in a development that had nothing to do with the British tank board that designs these things and sets requirements, the 3rd in line for British Leyland talked to engineers at Rolls Royce. Rolls Royce was well known for making engines that were very good, and they were asked if they could make a tank engine. Much to the surprise of everyone, Rolls Royce produced the meteor, and after a bit of testing offered it to the tank board to see if they wanted it. And the tank board did. They also were beginning to think that the merit brown transmission that the Churchills were using was pretty good too, and they requested that these be put together in the new tank, Cromwell. This was in January of 1942. So, one would expect production to start then, would they?

Yes, you can expect that that is what would happen, but that is not what happened. In order to build tanks, the British would use what they called the parentage system. One firm would oversee making the tanks, and they would have subcontractors handle components and assist in production by producing additional tanks under instruction of the main firm. The main firm for the Cavalier was the Nuffield company, and when asked to get rid of the Liberty engine and the Crusader transmission and move to the Meteor and Merrit-Brown, they just said no. and they built 500 Cavaliers.

Ok, so Nuffield does not want to build Cromwell’s, even though the British army wants Cromwell’s and thinks it is much better even by mid-1942. The solution is to add in more firms. Firms that have never built tanks before, or even components for tanks. So, you run into issues like where 100 Cromwell’s are marked as unsuitable for combat because the armor producer made mild steel plate instead.

But things get even more confused. Early in the Cromwell’s design period, there were concerns that the tanks engine was just not going to be able to be kept cool. And Leyland, the same folks who brought Rolls Royce into the equation, had an interesting response to this problem. Instead of adjusting the design of the radiators, or fans, or other such things, they just gave up. They told the tank board that the Cromwell was probably impossible, but they could make a similar tank just using the old Liberty engine, but the new Merrit-Brown transmission. This would be the Centaur.

The Centaur was an inferior tank to the Cromwell in all ways but one; the Centaur was much easier to produce because no one was using the liberty engine. The Cromwell’s production was constrained, because while Cromwell was the only tank using the meteor engine, there was a lot of competition for the near identical merlin. While the Ministry of Supply oversaw Meteor Production, the Ministry of Aircraft production had first dibs on the Merlin, and the tank builders would essentially get the leftovers that could be spared. Meanwhile, the liberty was totally unwanted by anyone but Nuffield and Leyland, so centaurs were being produced quicker than Cromwell at a rate of 5-1. As mentioned above, Exercise Dracula was supposed to convince the tank board to discontinue the Centaur, but after the trial there was talk of simply ceasing development on all Cruiser tanks because they were so bad at it and buying Sherman’s. It was only when the follow up trial was complete in November of 1943 that the Centaur had finally got the axe, after 1,821 were built.

Again, one of only 90 centaurs that actually see service

By this point RAF Fighter command was phasing the Merlin out, and a dedicated factory had been set up for the Meteor, so Cromwell production was able to fully spool up. By the end of the war, a total of 2,492 Cromwell’s were built. 574 of the Centaurs were converted to Cromwell’s, bringing the total up to 3066. 95 of the remaining 1300 centaurs saw action with the Royal Marines, the rest were converted into things such as dozers or used as training tanks. Cavalier was occasionally used as an observation post tank.

The second tank in this photo is the only evidence I have of a cavalier ever doing anything. it is one of the observation post tanks.

The last item of note concerns the up armored Cromwell’s with the welded hulls. Only 124 were made.

And that, my friends, is a small, maddening glimpse into the madness of British tank development in WWII.

Conclusions:

Oh boy, now we get to the point where we get to ask if the Cromwell is a paper tiger. Here is my answer. F* if I know.

If you think the Cromwell was the best tank of the war, or even a really good tank, you’re wrong. There is just too much going against it. The armor basically sucks, repairing it is usually a pain, it’s cramped, it usually is dangerous to the driver, and the low production from a horridly confused development cycle where at least a thousand tanks are built that do not see combat means this tank can’t be considered as a great vehicle.

However, if you think the Cromwell sucked, that also really doesn’t hold water. For its designed role, that of a tank for exploitation of a breakthrough, it is exceptional. Hell, it is almost the best of the war. It is certainly mobile enough for the role, and its top tier reliability means that it can exploit breakthroughs to the fullest. The gun may be out of date, but there are still lots of tanks in 1944 that the 75mm can beat, and incalculable amounts of other soft targets that a 75mm is more than enough for. When not tasked with punching though defensive positions, but following up and harassing a retreating enemy, this tank is the tool for the job. It is more specialized than the stalwarts of the US and Soviet army's, but at the same time it is not so specialized as something like the Hellcat. And the Cromwell also has a mitigating factor that helps it out. In the British Army there were Shermans and eventually Comets for all purposes, there were Fireflys and Challengers for anti-tank work, there were Churchills for breakthroughs and infantry support. The Cromwell was just a part of a large and diverse tank corps, and if it was deficient in a role there were other tanks that were not. unlike the T-34 and the Sherman, if the Cromwell was lacking in a area there were other tanks that could pick up the slack.

At the end of the day, weighing out the pluses and the minuses, it ends up being a right smack-dab in the middle average tank. given the wrong situation, it works horridly, and I can understand its detractors. given the right situation, it works wonderfully, and I can understand its supporters. Overall, it is adequate.

M18 Hellcat is a Tank Destroyer NOT a tank (just because it looks like a tank doesn't mean it is a tank).

6854699
Pssst
'slides link'
"sekrit dokuments comrade"

*reads article* That's a pretty good assessment of it. Killed any heretical or cowardly guardsmen lately commissar?

6855023

Really. One was a deep in the weeds teaboo who said that without it the germans would have been able to stabilize the lines after the Normandy breakout, making it not a breakout. Dont agree with that at all. Other basically quoted a lindybeige video about cromwells, and thought it used the 75mm hv from world of tanks. So they exist.

6855121
Good post, thanks. Liked how you described the differential transmissions, I spent days staring at them trying to figure out what they're doing.

Brit tanks seemed to have problems with hull hatches from what I've seen of Churchill videos. Interesting about the unreliability of APHE shells.
>glares at Warthunder

6855903
One case where realism breaks gameplay.

6855923
Perhaps, but I played through the period where Brit AP was complete garbo at splashing anything internal.

6855942
Oh.....

6855923

6855942
Yeah, war thunder is a game, so every tank crew acts like they are in 'Fury' and will fight to the (second to) last man. Instead of leaping out the second your tank gets a new and unexpected source of natural light.

I'm holding out for "IL-2 Sturmovik: Battle of Provkorovka" it may be 80 bucks, but right now it looks like the best tank sim on market.

6856138
Thanks for the reply commissar. Killed any traitorous or cowardly guardsmen lately?

6856150
Oh, a long time ago, I did. But it has been years since I've done that.

6856154
That's fine.

Yes.