Why Magic Ponies Should Be More Horse-Like, Part 2 · 1:13am Mar 6th, 2014
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This is what I want G5 to look like.
Yeesh, that's a lot of comments, enough to warrant another blog post. I'll try to give everyone his due here.
MrZJunior:
The laws of logic change with context, you would not apply Aristotelian logic an interpersonal relationship, the mind just doesn't work like that.
I do not know what is meant by applying Aristotelian logic to an interpersonal relationship. If I am, say, judging the rightness or wrongness of a relationship, such as my affair with my secretary behind my wife's back, I would need to employ logic to make the judgment, so, yes, I would apply Aristotelian logic to that interpersonal relationship.
Furthermore, the laws of logic do not change with context. A = A is true in all times and places regardless of circumstances. All rules of logic stem from two. The first is this: a thing is itself. And the second is like it: two mutually exclusive things cannot be true at the same time and in the same way. These rules are tautological and self-evident. They cannot be refuted, because the only tool you have to refute them is logic, the thing you are attempting to refute.
Lazygamer313:
So it would be like saying that 'A' cannot be equal to 'B' in an equation.
Depends on what A and B represent. If A is a species and B is a genus, then A can be B (i.e., man is a rational animal). If A and B are mutually exclusive, then A cannot be B.
And before anyone gets on my case, I am using genus and species in their logical, not their taxonomic, sense.
Things to watch out for, in that you can A=!B, but B<>!A, and that a man can be divided within himself, his parts adding to one reaction in one situation, and to a totally different reaction to a different situation . . .
Inner conflict is of course a common experience. A man can want two different things at once. The will is the intellective appetite, ordered toward good, so when faced with a dilemma, a man will choose the good that appears highest to him. That's why it is necessary to train the intellect and conscience, and to learn to restrain the appetites, in order to choose goods that are really higher and not merely apparent.
nothingtoseehere:
They, we, like our ponies small because we don't want to ride them, but 'ride' them; a course of action made potentially much less satisfying, and a lot weirder, by having your ponies be pony sized.
I considered putting a comment to that effect in my post, but then I decided that accusing my interlocutors and critics of bestiality is probably a faux pas.
Lukander:
On a side note, logic and ethics don't always play well together. Deontic logic(a modal logic for ethics) which more specifically involves the logic of obligation and duty, is rather wonky and non-intuitive.
Logic and ethics play together just fine, but neither plays very well with contemporary philosophers who want to throw over common sense in order to write a fancy thesis or research paper. And though I can no more fault a man for studying pure logic than I can fault him for studying pure mathematics, I remain skeptical of the notion that any recent discoveries in logic have practical application. There is nothing you can say with modal logic that you can't say better and easier with the regular kind.
Ethics is about praxis, about how you live your daily life. If this deontic modal logic is "wonky" and "non-intuitive," it is useless and probably wrong.
Two rational minds can be optimized for different problem solving methods. A good(though crude) example is a human chess master versus a dedicated chess playing computer. The human relies mostly on pattern recognition and meta-thinking.
A computer does not have a mind at all. It is a glorified adding machine. The mind behind the computer's chess program is the mind of the programmer who designed the computer to simulate the playing of chess. The computer does not think, makes no decisions, and has no will or appetites. It merely runs the operations it is designed to run. It happens to use electron configurations, but similar devices can be, and have been, made with interlocking gears.
AugieDog:
What if some alien sort of critter could feel the energy of molecular flux more strongly than we can? If they decided that a thing is never itself because the whirling of its electrons will make it a different thing from one nanosecond to the next? Or maybe they'd think that "A" can never equal "A" because Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle dictates that the simple act of noticing that something exists will change that thing in various ways.
I'd read a story like that, but I think the Buddhists beat you to it. Their doctrines of anatman and emptiness are basically this idea, that there is no essence, as evidenced by change. I believe this is a metaphysical error that can be cleared up with some important distinctions, such as that between matter and form, and between substance and accident. For example, the matter of your brain is replaced completely every fifteen years or thereabouts, but your brain remains intact throughout: that is, the form of brain, and the being of the brain, subsist as the material makeup of the brain changes.
PeepPony:
Whenever I think in regards to size on ponies, I just go back to episode four where it gives a pretty good comparison on size.
Man, those cows are huge.
Caden:
It's interesting how so many desire communication with non-human entities. I think it's actually a reflection of our fascination with ourselves. We want to hear an outside perspective on human nature, in order to better understand human nature.
Perhaps, or perhaps we are ordered toward communion with a mind other than our own, and thus seek it out. When I am enjoying the company of an animal, or another person, I seem to be enjoying it or him rather than myself.
schleepah:
It is a very silly thing to propose that ethics is could be universal in the way geometry is.
Here we go again. I think ours is the only period in history crazy enough to assert this.
Objective ethics is a necessary consequence of the existence of rational beings. A thing is itself, as already said, and to that logical principle we can add the metaphysical principle that everything that exists exists as something. This means that all existent things have an essence, or formal cause.
Now, as a human being, you have a human essence, which I also have, as does that other guy, and her, and him over there. Final cause is directly related to formal cause, and so, since we have a common essence, we have a common end. Because we also have rationality and volition, we can move toward our common end or away from it, and by this the morality of acts can be judged.
Incidentally, in 1967, the great Aristotelian Mortimer J. Adler got together at the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies with Wing-sit Chan, the great Confucian, and they and the others at the conference came to the conclusion that Aristotle and Confucius said the same things about ethics, differing primarily only in method and style. That is a remarkable coincidence if what they were studying had no objective reality.
History fail. Nietzsche was very strongly opposed to the Nazis . . .
I refer you to Nietzsche's On the Geneology of Morals, in which he attributes ethics to a Jewish conspiracy, or, rather, I don't refer you to it, because it's utter trash and a waste of your time. You will note I did not say he was a Nazi, only that the Nazis were his followers.
I don't follow your train of thought from "everything that exists exists as something" to "all existent things have an essence, or formal cause". Could you explain that in more detail, please? Or point me towards such a detailed explanation?
1899768 Here you go, ponies are about as big as well...ponies.
i.imgur.com/ZDc2JJ4.jpg
1899886
That seems to put them at two feet at the withers, so I lose the argument.
1899864
To say that a thing is some thing is the same as to say that it has an essence or formal cause. The essence or formal cause is what the thing is in itself. To say, "The Deej is a man," is to say what thing I am, and to say what my formal cause is (man).
1899897 Still bigger than what most brony's believe. They think they can pick these things up, like they're big plushies
1899984
I suppose they are still large enough for very small children to ride, but Megan would have smushed one. So it seems ponies have shrunk since G1.
(I mean in the franchise. I realize all continuity between the generations is only in my head.)
1899886 1899897
That puts them at two units at the withers. We don't know what the units are.
However, "two feet at the withers" matches the result we got in the other thread by assuming Earth-equivalent gravity.
That appears to make all the other organics we've seen--cows, dogs, cats, birds, apples--nearly one-to-one with the Earth version we'd be familiar with. Except for pigs. As I recall, the only pig we've seen was huge.
1899897
...I feel like I'm still missing something. The first sentence doesn't help me, and looks to me like a re-statement of what I wanted explained. The second sentence might be a definition, but if so that sounds axiomic and if not I'm still lost. Of the third sentence, I follow the first part ('To say, "The Deej is a man," is to say what thing I am'), but I'm not sure I follow the second part ('To say, "The Deej is a man," is to say what my formal cause is (man)'), and I don't follow the connection between the two.
1900024
The formal cause is what the thing is.
Blah, I just write ponies how they fit my current story 'cuz it's fun.
Good post. Pardon my previous comment post storm, it likely interfered with this blog post. I do think the computer vs. human analogy fits.
But alas I am one of those people that views the human mind as at least the byproduct of or "inhabitant" of a machine if not technically one itself.( I do not think the brain is a pre-programmed turing complete machine though).
One must admit, I think, that the stylized look of the ponies in the current generation lends itself to some memorable facial expressions and reactions that more realistic critters simply couldn't provide.
But I understand the appeal of rational humanized ponies in an intellectual sense. Think of Swift's Houhnyhnyms (sp?) who were, as I recall, presented as quite noble beings. Communication with such beings would have its own rewards. Just no "squees." 
1900047
So, from your perspective, I'm questioning an axiom?
1900056
It might have squees depending on how you feel about horses. Myself, I think more realistic but not completely realistic would be my preference. I agree with you about facial expressions. Disney had his animators study real deer to create Bambi, but they still shortened Bambi's muzzle and enlarged his eyes so his face would look more human, and so he could emote. Horses' physical indications of emotions, in real life, are subtle. I don't think a cartoonist should be that realistic.
1900054
I'm an Aristotelian-Thomist, as it seems to fit best with lived experience and to avoid some of the problems of other systems, particularly the trouble caused by Descartes' "ghost in the machine." That is, I view the mind as form, having the same relationship to the brain that sphere has to a basketball. The sphere isn't "in" the basketball in any physical sense, because a sphere is not physical.
1900080
Or a definition, rather. I'm trying to define the term clearly for you, and I seem to be failing. "Formal cause" means the same thing as "essence," which means the same thing as "what it is."
I imagine that Celestia's head is about level with a grown man's head. Around 6-6.5 feet or so. Luna is maybe 5-6 feet at the head, and regular ponies tend to be about 4-5 feet at the head, or basically eye level... Basically, you could hold a conversation with one of the ponies comfortably without looking up or significantly down... Maybe looking up at Tia!
I am also well aware of the standard measurements (in hands to the withers). I'm simply referencing measurements to the eyes at a normal posture. I think that would feel... natural.
1900094
I prefer to hold a conversation with a pony while I'm brushing her hair or coat, which would usually put me somewhere behind her head, making eye contact still difficult.
1900081 Ah. I ended up taking the mind defined as an independent entity is an illusion position. No brain, no mind.
Essentially 'The Chinese Box', where the conclusion is that the invisible bureaucrat, his rulebook and filing system are who your talking to. The bureaucrat isn't an independent entity functionally speaking.
As a matter of taste, I do prefer the ponies to be more horse-like. With any divergence handled (somewhat) realistically.
1900135
"No brain, no mind" is compatible with an Aristotelian position. But the mind cannot be the brain, or at least cannot be the matter of the brain, because the mind is not physical. If I think about an object, such as a pony, a little model of a pony doesn't appear somewhere inside my head, and thus thoughts are not physical things.
Simply look at the picture at the top of the post. Physically, it's light coming out of your computer screen, but what you see is not the physical components of your monitor. What you see, or I should say, what you "intend" or "are conscious of," is Rainbow Dash, which is a mental object rather than a physical one.
1900155 Granting that point can another hypothetical mechanism be said to have a mind, given it's nature or complexity is sufficiently like the brain?
1900155 Actually according to current cognitive neuroscience studies your brain as a model of a pony both as an collected symbol set(used for abstract reasoning) and one for its sensory traits(based off of previous sensory data).
1900083
Oh.
Well, if "formal cause" means "essence" means "what it is", why don't you just say that, then?
Unless you mean "essence" and "what it is" in an 'ideal' way, rather than a 'literal' way. Like the way the sphere isn't the basketball. Then I just don't understand what "formal cause" has anything to do with. You're defining it to be the same as the other two, which doesn't make sense to me. (Which is why I originally offered "or point me to an explanation".)
If I understood correctly in the previous paragraph, then I think my hangup is that "essence" and "what it is" sound like 'being'
wordsphrases, but "formal cause" sounds like a 'why'wordphrase, and I don't see how or why you're connecting the two.1900217
But what it does not have is a physical pony inside my head. When I think of a pony, my neurons fire, but a tiny pony doesn't appear in my brain. The firing neurons can only be interpreted by someone looking at, say, my MRI scan, if he asks me what I'm thinking about and I tell him. The symbols of the brain are not, and cannot be, self-interpreting. You could examine the neurons down to the subatomic level, and at no point would a pony appear.
1900185
I grant that, as far as I know, it is theoretically possible. What I don't grant is the notion that if we build a computer complex enough, a mind will magically pop out of it. There is no reason to think an adding machine will start thinking for itself if we add enough gears. All the talk about computers as minds is a metaphor gone bad; we describe a computer's operations as "thinking" because it reminds us of thinking, and at some point we confused ourselves into thinking that computers think.
1900268
Since I see I'm not helping, let me give you a slightly more technical definition:
To understand why I use the term, it might help to place it next to the other three causes. Everything can be described in terms of the four causes:
Formal cause: what it is
Material cause: what it's made of
Efficient cause: what made it
Final cause: what it's for
Formal cause and essence are synonyms. If you understand the thing's formal cause, you know its final cause.
1900101
Do you give backrubs?
I guess I gotta explain that. Be right back.
1900094
) 'Tia, I reckon to be about six feet to the top of the head, so height-wise about the same as talking to one of my human friends. Down a smidge but not really noticeable.
I peg the top of the 'average' pony's head--say, one of the main six--at about four feet. (So, about the same height as my little brother
Mind you, fliers, or Pinkie Pie, could be anywhere.
1900101
My first thought when I saw this was "would that be awkward for them?" I mean, it's not like the ponies normally hold conversations while grooming each other. (At least, not in the show. At least, not as far as I've gotten.)
But before I got too sunk into perverse metaphors, it occurred to me "well, I guess you could have a conversation with someone while giving them a backrub. I'd still find it a little weird, but then I've never tried it...."
Yeah, that was the best analogy for such a thing I could think of.
1900670
The ponies were designed for little girls to brush their hair, and thus the toys have always been brushable. It was my indignation at the lack of brushie-brushie in the show that inspired me to write A Mighty Demon Slayer Grooms Some Ponies, in which Megan brushes and otherwise grooms the ponies. She holds conversations with them while doing so, yes.
She also gives Twilight Sparkle a backrub in a scene I wrote after watching several equine massage therapists. Furthermore, the story contains some snuggling and there are, if memory serves, a total of four kisses exchanged.
1900662 Correct at face value, but an internal mental model of something exists as a definite physical state or dynamic physical process in the brain. A thought always has a material presence. Saying it is a immaterial thing is only a nod to ones own experience of cognition and a aid to categorization in such a manner to simplify reasoning over it. Useful at times, but inaccurate.
Self-interpretation* of symbols is the defining feature of symbolic reasoning, while I understand and to an extent agree with the point you are making, the this particular phrase* in this case obfuscates elements of it.
Eh, we are both discussing something with loaded terms, and implicitly are displaying annoyance at common misconceptions. Kind of drifted into piddling over semantics. Good exchange though.
I also don't buy into the processing power equals cognition misconception. The matter is more organizational, its not how much information is processed. Its how its processed. Though, any rational decision making process is still a rational decision make process regardless of what preforms it.
It's only a faux pas if it's not true. Seriously, dude, 4chan is a wretched hive of scum and villainy. It's like Mos Eisley Cantina, only with less Jedi and more neckbeards. I love AiE and /mlp/ to death, but it's hardly the place to go looking for a reasoned response to a rational question. Unless you like flame wars and pejorative racial slurs. Then, y'know, go for it.
1900828
The trouble with arguing with materialists is that they always slip immaterial things into their arguments while pretending they have not done so. "Symbol" is not material and cannot be.
Any symbol requires three things, the object that is symbolizing, the object symbolized, and the relation between them. The relation is not physical. There is no physical connection between a pony I observe and the idea of pony in my mind.
Symbols cannot be self-interpreting. You can interpret a symbol only if you know it is a symbol and know its relation to its referent. You could not get "pony" out of a collection of firing neurons unless you knew already that the man whose neurons were firing was thinking of a pony. That is like claiming you could understand the story in a book by weighing the book or measuring the number of molecules in the ink on the pages. The story is not a physical property of the ink.
Symbolism, by its very nature, requires immaterial properties. Material properties are those that can be measured with the standard SI units, such as length, mass, candlepower, moles of substance, and so forth. "Symbol" is not a physical property, and empirical data has nothing to do with symbolism.
No, I am not using shorthand. I am asserting and arguing that immaterial properties cannot be reduced to material ones.
1900670
Pinkie Pie is probably as close to representing quantum physics in the macroscopic world as you could ever get... You know, never knowing both her position and velocity... maybe one or the other... but NEVER both! only knowing the probably of her being in one place or another, and never definitely there until observed!
1900662
I feel like there's an internet axiom I should be spouting here...
Anyways. You define "essence" and "formal cause" to be the same, but they look different, and if they mean the same thing why do we have both? If they're synonyms, they share this definition but one or both of them has additional definitions, and that's what I'm interested in.
I don't understand the use of "cause", unless it's meant in a cause-and-effect-chain sense. Then I'd understand "formal cause" to mean "what it is" in the sense of "why it is the way it is", eg "a hammer is long and heavy at one end, because it is a tool for driving and pulling nails". But then I still don't understand the "formal".
I'm afraid your "four causes" don't help me. The "material" in "material cause" is obvious, but I can't reconcile the "cause" with any use of cause I'm famliar with. "Efficient" I can connect with "effect", giving me "efficient cause: what caused it". "Final cause" I can see as "towards what end it exists", that is, "why it exists" or "what it was made for".
I should probably pick appart my own thought process at this point. It may also be time to go googleing.
1902177
Bah. I was about to go through and disect what I was thinking, but I already googled. We'd already established to my satisfaction that what you mean by "essence" I'd have called "ideal". The "formal" in "formal cause" has to do with the form of a thing. I still don't grok the use of "cause" (and still have a niggling suspicion you're using the terms wrong, I just have different reasons now), but I didn't finish reading yet.
This understanding makes my orriginal question look
I'd have to call "failing" an understatement in this case.
1902177
Cause here I am using in the older sense. It does not mean cause-and-effect, which is efficient cause. The word has changed meaning over time.
Formal cause and essence mean the same thing, but with different connotations or emphases. Formal cause means form determining matter. Essence means what the thing is in itself as opposed to its accidents, that is, its genus and its specific difference, which make up its definition.
Form stands in contrast to matter. Essence stands in contrast to accident.
1902271
I'm left with a sense I should be googleing every third word you're saying, 'cause I'm lost again.
I'd reached an understanding of "formal cause" being the answer to the question, "why is this thing this shape?" For example, "a table is flat and elevated so things can be put on top of it." You seem to be implying a connection to what it's made of, as in "you wouldn't make a table out of water, because water is not rigid, and a table must be rigid in order to hold things up".
Similarly, I'd understood "essence" to be "ideal" as in "the idea of a thing", as in the idea of a hammer. You seem to be using it for that, and for "this particular thing", such as what makes this hammer this hammer, and not some other hammer or just a generic hammer.
Am I still missing something, as far as you can see?
I'm gonna go read up on Aristotle on Causality.
1901111 True to degree, I can boil anything into a material state within this universe. Because of this the line of reasoning flows in the other direction. Any immaterial thing such as a symbol) must be tied to a material thing. Even if it is just the electrochemical state of the reasoner considering it. Or a medium of communication and/or storage.
Material and immaterial 'objects' are interdependent(matter requires a set of immaterial laws in order to exist). The finer you dice a problem and the more specific you try to be with the details, the less you can separate the two. But, for an individual reasoning along that line, things can get complicated and the intended point becomes obfuscate. Hence it is often easier to separate the material and immaterial.for convenience sake.
To define a symbol as a symbol requires the use of another symbol. The rules of how to do so are themselves symbols. Else you cannot label it as a symbol. There is no thing that is non-material, and non-symbolic involved. One can say that a symbol boils down to a material state effected by other material states that themselves may be considered symbols or sub-symbolic. Immaterial things are symbolic, their connections are symbolic, their definitions are themselves symbolic and are self-referencing(digital computers rely on this principle, as do a number of non-digital systems). Only the substrate in which they are embedded may be non-symbolic, and if so is always material (this statement allows for virtual machines, and simulations).
I am a materialist only because the finer I scrutinize something, the more evident it's tie to a material substrate. I acknowledge that it is impractical to boil everything into a material unit or set of material units, and thus must express something as an abstraction.
Language inherently forces both of use to convey our thoughts with symbols embedded within a material medium.
All this being said, our two different philosophical models are more than worth comparing. Common points exist between both, and are well worth discussion..
1902395
The formal cause of the table is table; that's what the thing in question is.
To hold things on its top is its final cause, its purpose or end. If you know the formal cause, you know the final cause: holding things on its top is what a table does.
Wood (or plastic or whatever) is its material cause.
Form is the identifying and matter the limiting principle. It is a table because it has the form of table, and it is this particular table because its form is limited by its specific matter.
It has the essence of a table because its essential qualities make it a table, as opposed to its accidents (such as its color, or whether it has rounded or square edges), which can change without making it something other than a table. If I hack up the table into kindling, or break it down and rebuild it into a chair, I change its essence. If I sand it and repaint it, I change its accidents.
1902457
You are saying one moment that the immaterial exists and the next moment that it does not.
Let me make this simple for you: anything material can be measured with the seven SI units. Immaterial things cannot be. There is no such thing as a symbol with symbolic properties that can be measured with the SI units. True and false, fair and foul, are not material properties. Symbolism is not a material property, but a mental one. You cannot read a book by measuring its length and mass, and you cannot interpret the symbols on its pages unless you know their referents. The book is material, but its contents are not.
Computers, of any sort, do not interpret symbols. You are taking jargon from computer science and assuming it means the same thing in philosophy. It does not. It also sounds as if you are taking metaphors and interpreting them as if they are literal. Computers do not think, reason, judge, or interpret. They do not even do mathematics, which is a mental operation, just as an adding machine does not actually add. Computers are complex machines moved by external forces, and they do only what they are designed to do. Their operations have meaning only because they are aids to the people who design and use them. Only people interpret symbols, even if they may use computers to aid them in interpreting complex ones, such as sophisticated codes; in the end, it is the man, not the machine, that understands the code, because machines do not understand things.
In short, your reference to computers is a red herring; computers have nothing to do with what we are talking about.
Again, whatever it might mean in computer science, outside that field, the idea of a self-referencing or self-interpreting symbol is nonsense. A symbol is a representation of something else. The connection between symbol and referent is not a physical property. There is nothing physical connecting the symbol "A" and an "ah" sound. The connection is a mental one.
1911836 The argument that an adding machine does not add is on the same level as stating that a brain does not think. Physical processes underlay both, and the brain only does as it was designed to do. I argue that the mind divorced from the brain is a non-entity, it is non-existent and has no defining features aside from the brain's. The mind in common usage is merely a description of the brains state and processes, rooted in self-reflection or external observation.
The statement that a machine does not think reflects that it was not designed to preform one or more functions used to define thought in context. As of the last quarter century the chosen requisite functions or the definition of those functions have changed over time to keep ahead of automated performance of said functions and processes. That said, I think this reflects that previous minimum requirements were to loose or weak.
Most Computer Science and Cognitive Science jargon is derived from philosophy, as are all the sciences. All changes relative to philosophy where made to more closely match empirical data, and allow for testing. Something which previously was not possible or at least highly valued in those fields when the original philosophical formalisms were made.
Uprooting abstract things from their material base only aides in usage and interpretation in relation to one another. It is an intellectual tool, not a accurate description of the universe. And is meant to keep a problem within a human beings intellectual depth.
Your statements seem to demand agreement with Plato's argument of ideal forms, as well as Descartes Dualism. As literal truths and not as conveniences or potentially flawed models.
1911836 At this point I would like to render an apology as our discussion has become more personal in nature. In all honesty it is not my desire to undermine vary valid conclusions drawn from a different prospective. This started with common points being validated from different philosophical bases and my enthused reaction to this.
My conduct at this point in conversation has been in poor taste and has taken on an overly confrontational tone. Leading us both to behave in a reflexively defensive manner.
Having no wish to join the ranks of aggressively dogmatic Materialists. Of whom you seem to have had rather unpleasant exposure to, and their unreasonable rejection of any common conclusions. I acknowledge, agree with and have great respect for the ethical arguments you have made previously and the conclusions drawn.
As a Materialist they describe something that appears to be true. That I use a slightly different line of reasoning does not change that. And I am opposed to those Materialists that reject valid conclusions from non-Materialists out of hand*.
*My recent tone certainly did not help in this matter.
I will refrain from unnecessary debate over differences in fundamental assumptions and ask only that you do not dump me in the same category as those that out right refuse to see any commonality based upon reflexive opposition or treat science as 'magic' or an exercise in absolute truths (for that matter also the, well, knuckleheads that misuse the word relative as a equally 'magical' keyword to win debate or close conversations up).
Well good day to you, I hope to have more fruitful and pleasant discussions in future.